George Wrisley gwrisley@northgeorgia.edu Nietzsche and the Value of Suffering—Two Alternative Ideals I Introduction What follows is a partial reconstruction of a central thread to Nietzsche’s answer to the question of what our attitude toward suffering should be. I will argue that according to Nietzsche our attitude toward suffering should be one in which we embrace our suffering and attempt to take on as much difficult responsibility as possible. Such an attitude is to be coupled with an embracing of Nietzsche’s alternative to what he calls the ascetic ideal. However, given Nietzsche’s notion of the order of rank, it is clear that he does not think that this is a possibility open to all. This reconstruction is partial because it considers the value of suffering primarily as a means. Bernard Reginster provides good reason for thinking that suffering also has contributory value. 1 I will not address that aspect of suffering and power here. Brian Leiter argues that before Nietzsche the ascetic ideal was the only means to give meaning to human suffering. While Leiter argues that the alternative Nietzschean ideal requires acknowledging that suffering has no meaning, I will argue that he is mistaken. It should be noted that the aim of this paper is to reconstruct Nietzsche’s views; it is not to evaluate them critically (this latter is a worthwhile project—it just isn’t one carried out here). As such, this paper is not an endorsement of Nietzsche’s views. II Suffering as a Constituent of Life “To live is to suffer”: this is only contentious if we thereby mean that to live is only to suffer. If we say that suffering pervades life, then that need not mean that there are no pleasures in life. Even still, is it true that for every individual, life will involve suffering? Other than those who are born and die a quick, painless death shortly thereafter, the answer is surely going to be yes. However, before we rightfully answer whether life automatically means suffering, we should say what is meant by suffering. If we look at suffering as a genus, we can say that psychological suffering and physical suffering are its species. 2 It is easy to think of examples of both kinds. 3 Under mental suffering we find depression, anxiety, fear, unsatisfied desires (perhaps even desire itself before it is satisfied), loneliness, loss, anguish, grief, separation, lamentation, distress, dissatisfaction, rejection, failure, hopelessness, stress, boredom, ennui, angst, 1 In his excellent The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism. See especially chapters 3-6. This paper also leaves aside Nietzsche claims regarding suffering’s being desired for its own sake, e.g., the Will to Power, 1041. 2 There are of course many different ways one might categories kinds of suffering. At one point, the Dalai Lama, for example, divides kinds of suffering by the kinds of causes: either avoidable or unavoidable. Examples of the former are war, poverty, and crime; examples of the latter are sickness, old age, and death. Ethics For The New Millennium, 133-4. 3 What follows is not meant to be an exhaustive list.