NeuiIdear Psjchol. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Vol. 3, No. 2. pp. 165-176, 1985 Printed m Great Britain “732-1 IXXI85 $3.00+0.00 Pergmnn Press Ltd OLD MEAD IN NEW BOTTLES: THE IMPERSONAL AND THE INTERPERSONAL IN INFANT KNOWLEDGE* zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgf JOHN R. MORSS Department of Psychology, University of Ulster at Jord:mstown, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim, BT37 OQB, N. Ireland Abstract - Orthodox cognitive-developmental theory has tacitly assumed that knowledge is private and that it arises in the individual from asocial negotiation with physical objects. In contrast, a ‘newhleadian’ (social- constructivist) school holds that knowledge is interpersonal and zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXW arises from early social interaction. This paper argues that a more satisfactory alternative to the private (personal) account is not an in/opersonal but an impersonal (public) account. Early knowledge would thus be seen as inherently accessible to observation. Such ;I position is indicated, it is argued, 111 Piaget’s formulation of sensorimotor intelligence and in Bower’s rule-following model. It is suggested that the neo-Meadian model of infancy is essentially conservative, in stressing communicative inferiority on the part of the infant. Further, it seriously distorts Mead’s own cohesive account of development through infancy and childhood. It is noted finally that Mead’s philosophical stance - a realist pragmatism - is in fact consistent with an impersonalist position. It is therefore suggested that Mead’s realist version of social behaviourism be taken seriously. The purpose of this paper is to examine the claims of contemporary advocates of a social-constructivist approach to an understanding of infancy. Its purpose is not (or is only by allusion) a critique of social-constructivism in general. It focuses on recent attempts to apply certain components of the work of George Herbert Mead to a psychology of infant cognition [l-9]. As well as offering criticism of these attempts, it proposes an alternative which, it is claimed, would represent a more accurate application of Mead in this context. SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE ‘NEO-ICIEADIAh” SCHOOL ‘The social construction of reality’ (and/ or knowledge) is popularly taken as a reasonably accurate paraphrase of an epistemological position ascribed to Mead and his followers. Before Mead, Durkheim had formulated a sociology based on social realism: that is, the rigorous insistence that social structures are antecedent to individual experience. Peirce, a philosopher, developed zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTS ~rugtttmksm as a form of social realism and Mead’s own pragmatism was a continuation of that of Peirce [ 101. Thus, as shown by Lewis and Smith [ 101, Mead’s pragmatism stood in opposition to the individualist pragmatism of William -James, with its focus on the primacy of subjective experience. Mead’s position on the social nature of knowledge will be examined at greater length below. Here it should be noted *Paper presented to Annual Conference, British Psychological Society (Developmental Section), University of Lancaster, Seprember 1984. 165