PETER DE MARNEFFE AN OBJECTION TO ATTITUDINAL HEDONISM ABSTRACT. This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as a theory of what is intrinsically good for us because it implies that nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does not have the psychological capacity for the proposi- tional attitude of enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacities that humans have. Fred Feldman has recently stated an extremely plausible version of hedonism according to which a person’s well-being varies in propor- tion not only to the amount of enjoyment she takes in things, but also in proportion to whether these things are real and whether they are worthy of enjoyment. 1 This version of hedonism can be effectively defended against a number of familiar objections because of what it does not imply. It does not imply that the only thing of intrinsic value is pleasure or enjoyment. Other things like truth, justice, and beauty may be intrinsically valuable. Attitudinal hedonism implies only that the only thing that is intrinsically good for a person is enjoyment. This version of hedonism does not imply that all that is good for a person is sensory pleasure; what is good for a person is the mental attitude of enjoyment, a particular propositional attitude, like belief, hope, and fear. This version of hedonism does not imply that the life of someone whose enjoyment is taken from false beliefs – that his colleagues admire him, for example – is as good for him as the life of someone whose enjoyment is taken from true beliefs, even if the amounts of enjoyment are the same. Finally, this version of hedonism does not imply that the life of someone who takes enjoyment in hurting people is just as good for him as the life of someone who takes enjoyment in helping them, even if the amounts of enjoyment are the same, since helping others is a more worthy source of enjoyment. Philosophical Studies 115: 197–200, 2003. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.