Power Holders and Social Dynamics of Participatory Development and Reconstruction: Cases from the Democratic Republic of Congo PATRICK M. KYAMUSUGULWA and DOROTHEA HILHORST * Wageningen University, The Netherlands Summary. — One of the challenges of participatory development and reconstruction programs is how and where to engage with power holders. This paper analyses the dynamics of power relations within a community-driven reconstruction program in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It shows that, in some circumstances, elite control can be a way of ensuring the provision of pubic goods and that conflict between elites can benefit project outcomes. The paper concludes that in this and similar contexts, development programs should consider bringing elites into the equation of governance and invest in understanding better the working and accountability of existing institutions for development. Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Key words — community-driven reconstruction, power relations, public goods, elite influence, Democratic Republic of Congo 1. INTRODUCTION Post-conflict reconstruction in the 1990s was criticized for being too state-centered and top-down (Barakat & Zyck, 2009; Kyamusugulwa, Hilhorst, & Van Der, 2014; Paris, 2004). In response, development agencies have increasingly sought to develop alternative approaches that aim to strength- en institutions at the local level. One of these approaches, popularized by the World Bank and international NGOs, is community-driven reconstruction (CDR). These programs have the dual objective of restoring services and infrastructure while enhancing accountability in development (Kyamusugulwa, 2013a). CDR has become an increasingly prominent approach, representing multi-million project port- folios, and has been adopted as one of the main instruments of direct development intervention both by bilateral donors and by international bodies and agencies, such as the World Bank, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Development Programme. CDR programs need to consider how to deal with estab- lished power holders which may not be perceived by the inter- vening parties as accountable or democratic (Gaventa, 2006, pp. 23–27; Hickey & Kothari, 2009, p. 89; Kyamusugulwa, 2013b). CDR programs then face the strategic question: to by-pass existing power holders or to involve them? One of the key players in the development assistance sector, the Inter- national Rescue Committee (IRC), has opted for the first strategy and sought to establish elected committees of men and women that would handle a small fund for local recon- struction. This paper is based on qualitative research in 15 of 34 target villages by the Tushiriki/IRC program in the chiefdoms of Burhinyi and Luhwindja in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It focuses on the (hid- den) roles of elites in this community-driven reconstruction program. Blair (2000) and Lyne (2008) recognize that chiefs, religious leaders, or other forms of authority play a crucial role in public sector reform and participatory development intervention. But their actual role and interactions are under-researched. By analyzing the role of power holders in CDR, this paper aims to contribute to debates on local gover- nance in the DRC. It argues that, in some circumstances, elite control can be a way of ensuring the provision of pubic goods. The next section of the paper elaborates the conceptual framework that underpins the analysis and is followed by a section that describes the evolution of the state, church, and traditional authorities in the DRC and South Kivu. Then, a section that outlines the questions, setting, and methodology which is followed by the description of the two case studies. The final section discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: POWER, AUTHORITY, AND ELITES Relations of power are relations of social influence in which the opinions and attitudes of one person affect the opinions and attitudes of another person (Gaventa, 2006, p. 22; Mitchell & Reid, 2001, p. 118). Power holders may use hard strategies by seeking obedience through intimidation and aggression, they may use rational strategies by bargaining and logic, or they may use soft strategies by seeking submis- sion through a polite, friendly, or humble manner. But what makes domination continuous and systematic is the belief by the ruled in the legitimacy of the leaders (Adams, Sartori, & Waldherr, 2007, p. 21; Pakulski, 1986). In central African countries, particularly in the eastern DRC, there are important actors that derive their legitimacy from what Weber called ‘traditional authority’, as authority is often primarily anchored in ‘spiritual powers’, or the energy * The authors are grateful to Paul Richards for his significant contribution to this paper. They are thankful to Carolien Jacobs for her valuable co- mments during the revisions of the current paper and to two anonymous readers for the criticism and advice they would raise. The authors are grateful to the Dutch Government and its agency based in the Hague Stichting Vluchteling that funded this research. They are indebted to the Marie-Curie for the support during the preparation of the current study, to the International Rescue Committee senior and field staff and to the people of Burhinyi and Luhwindja for their collaboration during data collection of this study. Final revision accepted: February 1, 2015. World Development Vol. 70, pp. 249–259, 2015 0305-750X/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.02.002 249