Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2002 Moral Schemas and Tacit Judgement or How the Dening Issues Test is Supported by Cognitive Science DARCIA NARVAEZ & TONIA BOCK University of Notre Dame, USA ABSTRACT Ideas from cognitive science are increasingly inuential and provide insight into the nature of moral judgement. Three core ideas are discussed: modern schema theory, the frequency of automatic decision-making and implicit processes as the default mode of human information processing. The Dening Issues Test (DIT) measures the beginnings of moral understanding, which are largely non-verbal and intuitive, in contrast to the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI), which measures the highest level of verbal understanding. The positive attributes of the DIT and its conceptualisation of moral judgement schemas are more apparent in a time of increasing respect for implicit knowledge and processing. The DIT offers a means of measuring moral judgement that ts with current views in cognitive science. Although the MJI and interview techniques generally are worthwhile for measuring production competence, the DIT is better able to measure understanding at the level that drives most decisions for most people. Historically, philosophy has described moral judgement as conscious and delibera- tive decision-making. Consequently, studies of moral judgement usually focus on testing conscious, thoughtful reasoning about moral dilemmas (e.g. the Moral Judgement Interview [MJI], Colby, Kohlberg et al., 1987; Moral Competence, Lind, 1995; Sociomoral Reection Measure [SRM], Gibbs & Widaman, 1982), distribu- tive justice (Damon, 1975; Enright et al., 1981) and particular non-development distinctions in moral judgement (e.g. “domains,” Turiel, 1983; “culture,” Shweder, 1991; and “orientation,” Lyons, 1982). Common to all these methods is the need for the participant to give a verbal rationale for a decision (orally, as in the MJI, or in writing, as in the SRM). It is assumed that participants make their moral judgements reectively, that they are able to articulate them, and that the method can be “error-free” (Kohlberg, 1976). Participant verbalisations are puried of specic content and scored for evidence of underlying cognitive structures. In this context, the Dening Issues Test (DIT) has always stood out as a measure “apart”. Spawned from research in moral comprehension (Rest, 1973), the ISSN 0305-7240 print; ISSN 1465-3877 online/02/030297-18 Ó 2002 Journal of Moral Education Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0305724022000008124