ON SENSORIMOTOR CONTINGENCIES: THE TEMPORAL CONSTITUTION PROBLEMATIC 1 Constantinos Picolas University of Patras, Greece Elaboration of the problem. According to sensorimotor theory the active variation of input (either actual or potential variation) is considered constitutive for perceptual objectivities. The passive variation of input is often considered as also ĐoŶstitutiǀe ;e.g. O‘egaŶ ϮϬϭϭ: ϯϭͿ. But ǁhile the first warrants the use of the term sensorimotor, the latter does not. The issue can be raised then, that the fact that for sensorimotor theory passive input ǀaƌiatioŶ has a ĐoŶstitutiǀe ƌole to the peƌĐeptual oďjeĐts pƌeseŶĐe is iŶĐoŵpatiďle ǁith its more central claim about the embodied perceiver's necessary active role in the constitution of perceptual presence (cf. Cavedon-Taylor 2011). The usage of passive variation as a constitutive factor of perceptual objectivities nevertheless indicates that it must play some role for the sensorimotor approach, a role that has not been accounted for. The common ground. What is the common character that passive and active sensory variation share? We get a textual hint as to this ĐhaƌaĐteƌ fƌoŵ the folloǁiŶg: …to investigate the nature of experience we must direct our investigations not to some ineffable inner event, but rather to the temporally extended activity itself, to the laǁs that goǀeƌŶ this aĐtiǀitLJ ;O‘egaŶ &Noë ϮϬϬϭa: ϴϬͿ. What is heƌe ĐoŵŵoŶ to passi ve and active sensory variation is this character of the necessary temporal extension of perceptual experiences. This character should not be understood to refer to the mere passage of experiences in time but instead to the very constitution of experience as temporally extended. And this temporally extended lawful variation of input can be further characterized as passive or active. But sensorimotor theory elaborates only on the characters of activity and lawfulness of variation by utilizing its central notion of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), and fails to notice and elaborate on the more fundamental character of raw durationality or temporal extensionality of experiences. How is this fundamental temporality of experience accomplished and does the sensorimotor approach possess the resources to address this problem? WheŶ foƌ edžaŵple O‘egaŶ ǁƌites that [h]aǀiŶg the feeliŶg of softŶess does Ŷot oĐĐuƌ iŶ LJouƌ ďƌaiŶ; rather, it resides in your noting that you are currently interacting in a particular way wit h the spoŶge (2011: 108) he appeals to a first personal description of a currently enacted perceptual (even if haptic) temporally extended activity. Temporal extension is not here merely contingent to experiencing but an essential character of perception: to be able to note the quality of the specific haptic interaction, the flow of sensory interaction should not be lost at the time that it falls into the immediate past. If this were to happen no coherent and temporally extended quality of interaction could be entertained. On the contrary, the flow of sensory stimulation must somehow simultaneously 1. be retained as the immediate past of the ongoing interaction and 2. projected anticipatorily as possible to re-occur. This is a temporality inherent in basic sensorimotor interaction, a kind of capacity constitutive of sensorimotor contingencies themselves. I propose that this problematic of temporal constitution can shed light on 1 This is the text of a poster presented at the 2015 ASSC Workshop on Sensorimotor Theory (Paris: July, 2015)