ROBERT zyxwvuts N. CHARETTE, ITABHI Corporation WO years after the start of the US Federal Aviation Administration’s $4.3 billion Advanced Automation System project contract in 1990, the Government Accounting Office stated that continuing delays in the deployment of the T Initial Sector Suite System, a key component of the AAS, could “have the potential for affecting FMs ability to handle safely the predicted increases in traffic into the next centu- zy ry.”’ Later that year, the AAS project schedule was extended by 19 months. The FAA blamed the delay on their underestimating the development and testing time for the ISSS software, as well as on unresolved differences in the system specifications caused by changes to the requirements. By April of 1994-following an additional 14-month schedule delay in early 1993 (blamed once again on ISSS-related software problems)-FAA management declared the AAS project “out of control.” At that point, the cost for AAS completion was pre- dicted to reach over $7 billion, with yet another schedule slip of up to 3 1 months possible. At this point, the FAA effectively sus- pended the AAS program. zyxw 0740 7459/96/805 00 0 zyxwvut 1996 IEEE JULY 1996