Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921–2001 JOHN R. ONEAL University of Alabama JAROSLAV TIR University of Georgia A democratic leader, anticipating a ‘‘rally ‘round the flag effect,’’ may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Im- manuel Kant’s prescription for ‘‘perpetual peace.’’ We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921–2001, using both di- rected and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autoc- racy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the demo- cratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful dem- ocracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Although economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant’s hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced. Scores of studies indicate that democracies are much less likely to become involved in military conflict with one another than are two autocracies or a mixed pair of states. This is good news because the number of democracies continues to grow. The long-term prospect, according to Immanuel Kant (1991 [1795]) and other liberals, is a world of democratic states living together peacefully. There has been an important undercurrent of research, however, suggesting that democratic leaders sometimes have an incentive to use military force, not to make their countries more secure, but to improve their public approval ratings and their chance of remaining Authors’ note: We are grateful for the helpful comments of Margit Bussmann, Giacomo Chiozza, Ben Fordham, Hein Goemans, Will Moore, Thomas Plu ¨mper, Bruce Russett, Gerald Schneider, Alastair Smith, and especially Karl DeRouen. We are also indebted to Giacomo Choizza and Hein Goemans for the use of their data on political leaders. Our data and the Stata do-files used to produce our results are posted at http://www.isanet.org/data_archive.html. r 2006 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. International Studies Quarterly (2006) 50, 755–779