Ching-Ping Tang is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, director of the master’s degree program in Asia-Pacific studies, and associate dean of the College of Social Science at National Chengchi University (Taiwan). He is also editor in chief of Taiwanese Political Science Review. He has published in several different fields, including sociology (Human Ecology), environmental studies (Environment and Planning A), area studies (China Quarterly), developmental studies (Journal of Developmental Studies), and political science (Comparative Politics). He holds a doctorate from the University of Southern California. E-mail: cptang@nccu.edu.tw Shui-Yan Tang is Frances R. and John J. Duggan Professor in Public Administration in the Sol Price School of Public Policy at the University of Southern California. His research focuses on institutional analysis and design, common-pool resource governance, and collaborative governance. He is author of Ten Principles for a Rule-Ordered Society: Enhancing China’s Governing Capacity (China Economic Publishing House, 2012) and Institutions, Regulatory Styles, Society, and Environmental Governance in China (with Carlos Lo; Routledge, 2014). E-mail: stang@usc.edu 220 Public Administration Review • March | April 2014 Public Administration Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 2, pp. 220–231. © 2014 by The American Society for Public Administration. DOI: 10.1111/puar.12190. Ching-Ping Tang National Chengchi University, Taiwan Shui-Yan Tang University of Southern California Public governance often involves policy tools and stake- holders from multiple sectors. How different policy tools are used may affect the chances that the values and inter- ests of diverse stakeholders can be aligned in mutually supportive ways. Drawing on insights from behavioral and cognitive economics, this article uses the case of land and ecological conservation in Twin Lake, Taiwan, to illustrate how various interactive dynamics—hierarchical exclusion and preemptive effects—may affect efforts in land and ecological conservation involving stakeholders from multiple sectors. Such illustrations may inform the choice and sequencing of policy tools for facilitating col- laborative governance. C ollaborative governance has been a major focus of research in public administration in the past decade. he special issue of Public Administrative Review on “Collaborative Public Management” in 2006 featured major research topics in negotiation, conflict resolution, dispute system design, and consensus building (O’Leary, Gerard, and Bingham 2006, 8). An important topic mostly left out of that special issue concerns stakeholders’ incentives for collaborative partnership. Creating the right incentives for stakeholders to work with each other is crucial for the success of collaborative governance. Developments in psychology and behavioral and cognitive econom- ics in past decades have also highlighted the complex interactive dynamics among different forms of incen- tives. Yet knowledge about these complex dynamics has seldom been applied explicitly to study collaborative governance issues. his article is an attempt along this direction, focusing on a specific type of governance task: land and ecological conservation. Ecological conservation is inevi- tably intertwined with land-use issues, as species habitation and migration patterns seldom coincide with jurisdictional and landownership boundaries. In the United States, given the cross-jurisdictional nature of biodiversity issues and the legal threats associated with the Endangered Species Act, agencies from different levels of gov- ernment increasingly have been motivated to work together to develop and implement programs for supporting biodiversity (homas 2003). he mat- ter becomes more complicated when landownership is taken into consideration, as more than half of the species on the endangered species list have at least 80 percent of their habitats on private lands (Innes, Polasky, and Tschirhart 1998, 35; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1997). 1 his fact creates many potential conflicts between nature conservation and land-use rights. Similar problems appear in many other countries; solutions to these problems often require coordinated efforts from multiple stakeholders across different sectors. 2 Land and ecological conservation can thus serve as a valuable window for examining crucial issues in collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012; homson and Perry 2006). here has been a steady stream of studies in public administration using this policy arena as the context for understanding collaborative governance (Imperial 2005; Jung, Mazmanian, and Tang 2009; homas 2003; homas and Koontz 2011; Weber 2009). his article adds on to this stream of research by highlighting the need for managing incentive dynamics in promoting collaboration in land and ecological conservation. here are many possible ways to coordinate efforts in land and ecological conserva- tion. he regulatory approach usually involves statutes or zoning regulations limiting the types of activities allowed in specific areas. It may also involve the use of eminent domain, such that private landowners are required by law to sell their lands at fair market Managing Incentive Dynamics for Collaborative Governance in Land and Ecological Conservation Ecological conservation is inevi- tably intertwined with land-use issues, as species habitation and migration patterns seldom coincide with jurisdictional and landownership boundaries.