The Southern Journal zyxwv of Philosophy (1994) Vol. zyxw XXXIZ zyx Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of “Relevant Possibility” John Greco Fordham University In this paper I defend a re1 vant possibilitie approach against a familiar kind of skepticism, and I argue that virtue epistemology can provide a theoretical grounding for the kind of solution that is offered. In the section that follows I outline both the skeptical problem and the solution. In the remaining sections I develop the proposal in more detail. If my argument is sound then the paper also constitutes an argument in favor of virtue epistemology. INTRODUCTION The skeptical problem I have in mind takes the form of an argument. That argument has its most famous articulation in the work of Descartes, but it has been discussed by many con- temporary writers as well. The central idea of the skeptical ar- gument is as follows: I do not know that a proposition is true on the basis of a set of evidence, unless that evidence rules out alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with my knowing what I claim to know. For example, I cannot know that the butler killed the Duke on the basis of the available evidence, unless that evidence rules out the possibility that the maid killed the Duke, or that the Duke committed suicide. But there are alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with my knowing anything about the external world, and which by their very nature cannot be ruled out. Descartes’s version of the skeptical alternative was the evil demon hypothesis. The modern version of Descartes’s evil demon hypothesis is the brain in a vat scenario. What is important to notice in the above argument is that the skeptic does not claim that either of his alternatives is true. The point is rather that they are possibilities that are in- consistent with my knowing, and therefore need to be ruled out before I can have knowledge. And there lies the real force John Greco is zyxwvu an assistant professor of philosophy at Fordham University. He has published several esays in epistemology. 61