Comparative Executive Clemency: The Constitutional Pardon Power and the Prerogative of Mercy in Global Perspective by Andrew Novak Abingdon: Routledge, 2016. xiv + 203 pp. Hardcover: £90* In 1977, Israeli academic Leslie Sebba published two articles comparing constitutional arrangements for executive clemency the world over. 1 Despite some thematic coverage in comparative constitutional law or death penalty textbooks, 2 and several smaller-scale comparative studies, 3 Sebba’s work remained the leading scholarship on executive clemency across national borders for almost 40 years. There are good reasons for the scarcity of academic literature on executive clemency (broadly defined as the executive branch reducing or abrogating lawfully-imposed punishment, without fully exonerating the prisoner 4 ), particularly in a comparative context. Clemency deliberations by executive decision-makers throughout the world are usually performed in secret, with public justification for the exercise of clemency rarely given. Accordingly, possible reasons behind death sentence commutations are rarely analysed in any systematic way. However, this does not make such research and less urgent. As Kobil observes, clemency and pardons now demand academic explanation to an even greater degree: ... like the monarchical power from which it derives, clemency is shrouded in mystery and often fraught with arbitrariness at a time when other aspects of [criminal justice systems] are becoming more open and fair. 5 Despite the lack of information about how clemency decisions are made and the factors that contribute to their frequency or scarcity, they usually determine whether or not a prisoner sentenced to death ultimately lives or dies, and hence are vitally important in criminal justice systems that retain capital punishment. 6 Moreover, given long-term sentences of imprisonment, clemency may operate as a final level of ‘appeal’ in cases of innocence or excessive punishment, or as a means to show leniency for reasons outside of those permissible by parole. Although the frequency of clemency grants has declined in a range of jurisdictions throughout the 20 th century, 7 recourse to clemency in capital cases is still mandated by the International * This review essay is forthcoming in the Asian Journal of Comparative Law (2017). Please contact the author at dcpascoe@cityu.edu.hk if you would like to cite the draft. 1 Leslie Sebba, ‘Clemency in Perspective’ in Simha F. Landau and Leslie Sebba (eds), Criminology in Perspective: Essays in Honour of Israel Drapkin (Lexington Books 1977); Leslie Sebba, ‘The Pardoning Power: A World Survey’ (1977) 68(1) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 83. 2 For example: Wen-Chen Chang et al, Constitutionalism in Asia: Cases and Materials (Hart 2014), 129-136; Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (5 th ed, OUP 2015) 312-321. 3 For example: Ariane M. Schreiber, ‘States That Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty – A Worldwide Perspective’ (1996) 29 Cornell International Law Journal 263; Rob Turrell ‘It’s a Mystery: The Royal Prerogative of Mercy in England, Canada and South Africa’ (2000) 4(1) Crime, History & Societies 83; Daniel Pascoe, ‘Clemency in Southeast Asian Death Penalty Cases’ (2014) Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society Policy Papers 1. 4 Andrew Novak, Comparative Executive Clemency: The Constitutional Pardon Power and the Prerogative of Mercy in Global Perspective (Routledge 2016) 159. 5 Daniel Kobil, ‘Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Clemency’ (1992 -1993) 27 University of Richmond Law Review 201, 202. 6 Cathleen Burnett, Justice Denied: Clemency Appeals in Death Penalty Cases (Northeastern University Press 2002) 16; Kobil (n5) 214. 7 Carolyn Strange, ‘Introduction’ in Carolyn Strange (ed), Qualities of Mercy: Justice, Punishment, and Discretion (UBC Press 1996) 14-15.