Chapter 9
The Hidden Acts of Definition in Law: Statutory
Definitions and Burden of Persuasion
Fabrizio Macagno and Giovanni Damele
Abstract The concept of “definition” refers both to a propositional structure,
namely a type of convertible relation between the definiens and the definiendum,
and a speech act that can have various definitional purposes. On the one hand,
definitions can have different subject matter. For instance, it is possible to define
a concept (essential definitions), the meaning of its linguistic expression (etymolog-
ical definition), its possible extension (definition by enumeration), an illustration of
its possible denotations (definition by example), or the operation that can be used
to classify the entities falling under it (operational definition). On the other hand,
definitions are the propositional content of acts aimed at producing specific effects.
Definitions can impose a new meaning, or remind or inform the interlocutors of
criteria of classification. However, from an argumentative perspective the acts of
stipulating, reminding or informing of, or committing to a definition are not as
dangerous as the implicit acts of omitting a definition and implicitly defining and
redefining a concept. Sometimes crucial concepts, especially the ones concerning
problematic ethical or political issues, are ill described or are left (intentionally or
unintentionally) undefined. This gap can become the ground of extremely effective
strategies based on tacit (re)definitions. These uses of definition can shed light on the
definitional activity of the lawmakers. Statutory definitions become in this sense a
limitation of the interpreters’ freedom of redefining strategically a concept. For this
reason, the choice of leaving a concept undefined or underdefined can be regarded
as a delegation of powers to the bodies in charge of interpreting the statutes.
Keywords Definition • Redefinition • Interpretation • Argumentation schemes •
Analogy • Rhetorical strategies
We would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia for the research grant on
Argumentation, Communication and Context (PTDC/FIL-FIL/110117/2009).
F. Macagno () • G. Damele
ArgLab, IFL, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa,
Lisboa, Portugal
e-mail: fabrizio.macagno@fcsh.unl.pt; fabriziomacagno@hotmail.com;
giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
M. Araszkiewicz, K. Pleszka (eds.), Logic in the Theory and Practice
of Lawmaking, Legisprudence Library 2, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-19575-9_9
225
fabrizio.macagno@fcsh.unl.pt