1 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in Chinese Open-Source Publications Gregory Kulacki Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists July 1, 2009 Introduction Americans are justifiably concerned about China’s military space programs, particularly China’s efforts to develop anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Unfortunately, U.S. assessments of these programs lack credibility because they are based on limited information from a small set of poorly evaluated Chinese sources. U.S. government reports on Chinese ASAT programs are not well documented and in some cases contain information that is demonstrably wrong. 1 Non-governmental assessments, which tend to rely on the information contained in government reports, suffer from the same shortcomings. Limited Chinese language proficiency contributes to this situation. Multiple assessments conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense over the past several years indicate that many of the specialists working on China do not meet the language proficiency requirements of the positions they hold. 2 Many of the non-governmental analysts writing on Chinese ASAT technology cannot read or speak Chinese. Insufficient language skills restrict many American analysts to the small and unrepresentative sample of Chinese sources that have been translated into English. Poor source selection is another reason American assessments of Chinese ASAT technology lack credibility. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the open source research arm of the Central Intelligence Agency, provides many of the translations referenced in U.S. reports on Chinese military affairs. FBIS tends to focus on Chinese newspapers, magazines, and web-logs; the reliability of these sources is often questionable and they generally do not contain specific information on subjects as technical or complex as ASAT technology. FBIS also employs hundreds of independent contractors as translators who are not trained in aerospace engineering, Chinese military terminology, or many of the other specializations needed to properly evaluate Chinese open source publications that refer to ASAT technology. The quality of the translations is, not surprisingly, uneven and inconsistent. The translations often fail to convey nuances important to understanding and 1 Gregory Kulacki and David Wright, “A Military Intelligence Failure? The Case of the Parasite Satellite,” August 16, 2004, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/china/page.cfm?pageID-1479 , accessed November 8, 2008 and Gregory Kulacki and David Wright, “New Questions About U.S. Intelligence on China,” September 15, 2005, http://www.ucsusa.org/jump.jsp?path=/assets/documents/global_security/NASIC-analysis-final-9-15-05.pdf , accessed November 8, 2008. 2 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Foreign Languages: Five Agencies Could Use Human Capital Strategy to Handle Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls,” GAO-02-237, January 31, 2002; GAO, “Foreign Languages: Staffing Shortfalls and Related Information for the National Security Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation,” GAO-C-02-258R, January 31, 2002; GAO, “Foreign Languages: Workforce Planning Could Help Address Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls,” GAO-02-514T, March 12, 2002.