Climate change: Motivation for taking measure to adapt Kristina Blennow a, *, Johannes Persson b a Southern Swedish Forest Research Centre, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, P.O. Box 49, SE-230 53 Alnarp, Sweden b Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundaga ˚rd, SE-222 22 Lund, Sweden 1. Introduction There is increasing evidence that climate change is occurring. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fourth assessment report there is ‘‘very high confidence that the global average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming’’ (IPCC, 2007, p. 3). Climate change has developed into an issue of widespread and major concern where efforts for mitigation and adaptation to changing conditions have been strongly recommended by the IPCC (2007) and put high on the political agendas of major governmental bodies, e.g. the EU (Grundmann, 2007). However, according to Heath and Gifford (2006) at least three characteristics of climate change make it different from other, better understood natural disasters or hazards (cf. Etkin and Ho, 2007). First, there is uncertainty as to whether climate change is actually occurring. Second, the gradual nature of climate change makes it harder to notice. Third, the causes of climate change remain uncertain and controversial. In their own right, these characteristics motivate prima facie doubt that any model of adaptation to climate change that does not take cognitive variables into account can be satisfactory. It is part of common wisdom that beliefs and desires influence action. For instance, in 1997 Weber found significant correlations between 48 North American farmers’ strength of belief in climate change and adaptive measures taken by them to reduce the negative consequences of climate change. Any theory of adaptation that does not make direct use of cognitive variables must rely on assumptions that beliefs will nevertheless be appropriately correlated with the non-cognitive variables explaining adaptive measures in the model. The characteristics claimed by Heath and Gifford (2006) make this assumption somewhat implausible. This is because lack of robust knowledge leads to problems when trying to accurately monitor the risks involved (cf. Sahlin and Persson, 1994; Persson, 2007) and allows for considerable variation in strength of belief in climate change among individuals. The psychological and cognitive aspects of adaptation to climate change are receiving increasing attention (cf. overviews by Oppenheimer and Todorov, 2006; Adger et al., 2007). For instance, Grothmann and Patt (2005) argue that socio-cognitive variables ought to be included in models of adaptation and adaptive capacity. Their case studies build on adaptation to well- defined events such as farmers’ adaptation to risk of drought in Zimbabwe and residents’ proactive adaptation to the risk of river flooding. Their model adds to the preconceived implausibility of models of adaptation to climate change only in terms of objective, physical, institutional or economic constraints. It can, however, only indirectly shed light on the importance of cognitive aspects for explaining adaptation to a global, long-term phenomenon, such as climate change. In particular, since Weber’s findings in 1997 little appears to have been done on the link between strength of belief in, and Global Environmental Change 19 (2009) 100–104 ARTICLE INFO Article history: Received 14 April 2008 Received in revised form 1 September 2008 Accepted 20 October 2008 Keywords: Adaptation Belief Adaptive capacity Epistemic risk ABSTRACT We tested two consequences of a currently influential theory based on the notion of seeing adaptations to climate change as local adjustments to deal with changing conditions within the constraints of the broader economic–social–political arrangements. The notion leaves no explicit role for the strength of personal beliefs in climate change and adaptive capacity. The consequences were: (i) adaptive action to climate change taken by an individual who is exposed to and sensitive to climate change is not influenced to a considerable degree by their strength of belief in climate change and (ii) adaptive action to climate change taken by an individual who is exposed to and sensitive to climate change is not influenced to a considerable degree by their strength of belief in an adaptive capacity. Data from a 2004 questionnaire of 1950 Swedish private individual forest owners, who were assumed exposed to and sensitive to climate change, were used. Strength of belief in climate change and adaptive capacities were found to be crucial factors for explaining observed differences in adaptation among Swedish forest owners. ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. * Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 40 415230; fax: +46 40 462325. E-mail address: Kristina.Blennow@ess.slu.se (K. Blennow). Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Global Environmental Change journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha 0959-3780/$ – see front matter ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.003