GeoJournal 51: 65–71, 2000. © 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 65 European capital cities as political frontiers Gertjan Dijkink Amsterdam Study Centre for the Metropolitan Environment (AME), Department of Geography and Planning, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: g.j.w.dijkink@frw.uva.nl) Received 15 July 2000; accepted 22 January 2001 Key words: new social movements, capital cities, information society, protest, political geography Abstract The capital is the centre of the established order but it always had to accept a relatively uncontrollable world of individuals redefining urban space in their own way or pioneering new means of support. As their existence is both a political nuisance and a foreshadowing of institutional changes (sometimes revolutionary) of nation-wide importance, I call such ways of life political frontiers. One may wonder what will become of political frontiers in the information society (or ‘postmodern’ society) that, apart from borderless, has been described as ‘society without a centre’ as well. Actually information society is the prototype of a frontier society with self-responsible groups and individuals. However, capitals – even stripped of their governmental functions – may offer a symbolical environment (a condensation of space and time) that precisely satisfies the wants of those who wish to politicise a way of life. Niches for pioneering behaviour may get dispersed over a wider territory but new types of political activity will gravitate to the capital even if the capital’s official political status has dwindled. A historical prelude Historically the ‘frontier’ was the margin of the gradu- ally expanding civilised world. The concept belongs to the world of empires rather than states because frontiers involve poor central control and a low level of infrastructural power (Mann, 1986). Interest in the frontier concept has faded but globalisation and post-modernisation seem to justify its re- assessment (Kristof, 2001, forthcoming). More than four decades ago Ladis Kristof, a specialist in geopolitics, de- scribed the difference between frontiers and state boundaries as outer-oriented versus inner-oriented. Borderlands of the frontier-type “...feel neither bound by the centre or bind- ing its realm”. Rather they represent runaway elements and interests of the state’s corporate body” (Kristof, 1959). An American with East-European roots, Kristof may have been aware of two geographical movements of Western culture: the westward expansion of American settlers and the expan- sion of European culture by the Teutonic Knights in Central and Eastern Europe. American history introduced the no- tion of the frontier as a special way of life differing from civilised society but nevertheless a source of power and pride even to the extent that it became an ingredient of national identity (Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis (Turner, 1925)). The (German) frontier was a significant feature of Euro- pean medieval political geography, but with the coming of the Westphalian state system (1648), European space finally crystallised in (inner-oriented) boundaries and capital cities. From now on, such boundaries only moved as the result of centrally coordinated action, involving war and international treaties, and according to a time-model that should be called catastrophic rather than evolutionary. In European history, cities represented innovative forces defying authoritarian power (Murphey, 1954; Tilly and Blockmans, 1994). Trade-dependent wealth and citizen mo- bility helped to keep up the intellectual ferment in such places. They easily welcomed adventurers who had made themselves impossible elsewhere. As trade centres they were more outer-oriented and world-wise than kings. It is tempt- ing, therefore, to call cities the new variant of the frontier at the end of the Middle Ages. Capitals, more or less the tailpiece of the Westphalian state system, however, began to accommodate the dominant political institutions and social classes (civil servants) with a strong stake in the regimes ruling the country. The new political geography made cap- itals into central symbols of the ‘state’s corporate body’. How could such places embody something like a frontier? The age of nationalism that started at the end of the 18 th century only worsened the situation since the national idea proclaims the predominance of national interests over local interests. The capital became the symbol of national iden- tity, a place where the national ‘genes’ were worshipped along with the most precious products of contemporary na- tional genius and symbols of national power (architecture). Yet, these places staged revolutionary events as well. This is not surprising since capturing the state means capturing its ‘head’ (mirrored in the ominous micro-reality of behead- ings in revolutionary Paris). The question, however, is if there is reason to associate such catastrophic denials of the established order with the idea of a political frontier? According to Kristof’s definition those living at frontiers do not wish to capture the state or a centre. They are ad- dicted to a way of life in which new resources are tapped