Neuropsychologia 45 (2007) 966–976 Semantic relevance, domain specificity and the sensory/functional theory of category-specificity Giuseppe Sartori a,∗ , Francesca Gnoato a , Ilenia Mariani a , Sara Prioni a , Luigi Lombardi b a Universit` a di Padova, Padova, Italy b Universit` a di Trento, Trento, Italy Received 10 February 2006; received in revised form 25 August 2006; accepted 30 August 2006 Available online 27 October 2006 Abstract According to the sensory/functional theory of semantic memory, Living items rely more on Sensory knowledge than Non-living ones. The sensory/functional explanation of category-specificity assumes that semantic features are organised on the basis of their content. We report here a study on DAT patients with impaired performance on Living items and tests of Sensory knowledge, and show that this impairment not only disappears after parcelling out semantic relevance, but is also reversed if this parameter is appropriately manipulated. Although semantic relevance model predicts these results [Sartori, G., & Lombardi, L. (2004). Semantic relevance and semantic disorders. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 439–452], they run counter to both the sensory/functional theory and the domain-specific theory of category-specific impairment. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Semantic memory; Category-specific impairment; Sensory knowledge; Semantic memory 1. Introduction Concepts are assumed to be organised networks of seman- tic features (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969; Jackendoff, 1990, 2002; Minsky, 1975; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Saffran & Sholl, 1999; Smith & Medin, 1981). One way of analysing semantic features is to group them according to their content. In this regard, one of the most frequently examined distinctions is that between Sensory and Non-sensory features. Consider, for example, the concept Dog. 1, 2 A Sensory feature may be 〈has four legs〉. Non-sensory features may include functional (e.g., 〈is used for hunting〉), associative (e.g., 〈likes to chase cats〉) and encyclopaedic features (e.g., 〈may be one of many ∗ Corresponding author at: Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Universit` a di Padova, Via Venezia 8, I-35100 Padova, Italy. Tel.: +39 049 8276608; fax: +39 049 8276600. E-mail address: giuseppe.sartori@unipd.it (G. Sartori). 1 Concept names are printed in italics and names of semantic features in angled brackets. 2 Semantic features are also sometimes termed “properties” or “attributes”. breeds〉). 3, 4 The sensory/functional theory, one of the most influ- ential explanations of semantic memory impairment, is based on the distinction between Sensory and Non-sensory semantic fea- tures, and has been used to explain the puzzling phenomenon of category-specificity in semantic memory. This proposal has been enormously influential, spanning an entire area of empiri- cal enquiry (Allport, 1985; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Martin & Chao, 2001; Saffran, 2000; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). Category-specific semantic impairment may be found in neu- rological patients (most frequently following HSV encephalitis and DAT), who may show specific impairments for some cate- gories but not for others. One most frequent selective impairment 3 Throughout this paper, the term “concept” refers to a set of weighted semantic features; a semantic feature is used to describe any type of statement about the concept (both Sensory and Non-sensory). 4 Functional features are defined in different ways. Some authors use this term for features that directly refer to functions (e.g. 〈gives milk〉); others denote features physically defined by motor properties (e.g. 〈used for cutting〉, Farah & McClelland, 1991). Others have defined functional knowledge by exclusion to denote any property that is not physically defined (Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999). Throughout this paper, the term “Sensory feature” is used to describe semantic features that may be perceived in any modality and “Non-sensory feature” all other types of semantic features. 0028-3932/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.08.028