Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005) 574–588 www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp 0022-1031/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.11.005 Mood eVects on eyewitness memory: AVective inXuences on susceptibility to misinformation  Joseph P. Forgas a,¤ , Simon M. Laham a , Patrick T. Vargas b a School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia b University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA Received 11 February 2004; revised 7 October 2004 Available online 3 March 2005 Abstract Does mood inXuence the accuracy of eyewitness recollections, and people’s susceptibility to misleading information in particular? Based on recent aVect-cognition theories and research on eyewitness memory, three experiments predicted and found that positive aVect promoted, and negative aVect inhibited the incorporation of misleading information into eyewitness memories. This eVect was obtained for both positive and negative events (Experiment 1), and for recorded as well as real-life incidents (Experiment 2). Partici- pants had no meta-cognitive awareness of these mood eVects, and aVect-control instructions were ineVective in preventing them (Experiment 3). The cognitive mechanisms responsible for mood eVects on eyewitness memories are discussed, and the implications of these Wndings for everyday memories, forensic practice and for current aVect/cognition theorizing are considered.  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: AVect and cognition; Eyewitness memory; Social cognition Accurately remembering personally witnessed events is one of the more important cognitive tasks we face in everyday social life. Most people implicitly assume that their eyewitness recollections are generally accurate and reliable, and eyewitness memories are often accorded special evidentiary status by judicial and forensic organi- zations. This assumption of eyewitness accuracy, how- ever, may not always be justiWed. Research documents numerous instances of inaccuracies in eyewitness testi- mony and constructive memory errors (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Malpass, 1996; Penrod & Cutler, 1996; Schooler & Loftus, 1993; Wells & Loftus, 2003). Surprisingly, relatively little attention has been paid to the inXuence of mild mood states, as distinct from more intense emotions or arousal states on the accuracy of eyewitness memories (Brown, 2003; Wells & Olsen, 2003). Moods may inXuence memory at each of the three stages of the eyewitness process: when the event is Wrst witnessed (encoding stage), later when potentially mis- leading information is encountered (post-event stage), and Wnally, when the information is retrieved and judg- ments are made (retrieval stage). This paper will focus on the post-event stage, exploring the inXuence of moods on the incorporation of false information into subsequent recollections. Drawing on past research on eyewitness memory and recent work on mood eVects on informa- tion processing, these three experiments explore the pos- sibility that good moods can accentuate, and bad moods can inhibit the incorporation of subsequent misleading information into eyewitness reports, consistent with the information processing consequences of these aVective states. In particular, the more externally oriented and  This project was supported by a Special Investigator Award from the Australian Research Council and by a Fellowship from the Rocke- feller Foundation. The contribution of Stephanie Moylan is gratefully acknowledged. ¤ Corresponding author. E-mail address: jp.forgas@unsw.edu.au (J.P. Forgas). URL: www.psy.unsw.edu.au/Users/Jforgas/jforgas.htm (J.P. Forgas).