1 The Future of Philosophical Counseling: Pseudoscience or Interdisciplinary Field? Roxana Kreimer, Gerardo Primero Abstract This article aims to criticize Philosophical Counseling, and to explore what changes could be made to solve its main problems. The area of Philosophical Counseling is a practice that involves empirical claims, and those claims should be explored through empirical methods. We'll summarize the criticisms in 7 categories: (1) Lack of evidence that the Philosophical Counseling is beneficial (and not harmful, or ineffective); (2) Lack of training in assessment skills; (3) Professional intrusion (unlicensed practice of psychology); (4) Misconceptions about psychology and psychotherapy; (5) Misconceptions about science and empirical testing; (6) Lack of training in critical thinking and knowledge of cognitive biases; (7) Problems with the arbitrariness of methods and goals. Finally, we will suggest some strategies to prevent Philosophical Counseling from becoming a new pseudoscientific practice. Introduction The last 200 years of professionalization of philosophy have both upsides and downsides. Philosophy has generated many research programs, with their specific background, problems, aims and methods, and each research program has evolved and become more specialized and systematic. These changes can be valued as a form of philosophical progress. But there have been some downsides too. In the words of Hurtado (2012), analytic philosophy has become "a sophisticated precision tool that only serves to adjust a small screw". It has abandoned the political engagement in search of a better world, and the ideal of offering a worldview (i.e., a set of answers to questions concerning