What is morally salient about enhancement technologies? Auke J K Pols, Wybo N Houkes ABSTRACT The human enhancement debate typically centres on moral issues regarding changes in human nature, not on the means for these changes. We argue that one cannot grasp what is morally salient about human enhancement without understanding how technologies affect human action and practical reasoning. We present a minimalist conception of human agents as bounded practical reasoners. Then, we categorise different effects of technologies on our possibilities for action and our evaluation of these possibilities. For each, we discuss whether enhancement technologies have morally salient effects; which technologies show these effects; and whether these differ significantly from those of other, non-enhancement technologies. We conclude that enhancement technologies are morally salient in several respects, that not all enhancement technologies share all those morally salient respects, and that continuities with traditional technologies may be found in all morally salient respects. INTRODUCTION Whatever else the parties in the human-enhance- ment debate disagree about, they share the conviction that there is something morally salient about human enhancement technologies (HET) in general. ‘ Transhumanists’ argue that HET should be promoted; ‘bioconservatives’ maintain that they should be curtailed or at least approached with caution. This essay examines this shared presup- position by analysing the (technological) means used for human enhancement. We argue that neither party in the debate offers a clear analysis of what moral issues are exclusively or especially raised by HET whether opposed to other technol- ogies or to non-technological enhancement methods: both parties appeal to implicit and unsustainable views about human nature or about technology in general. This has, rightly, raised doubts that anything informative can be said about the moral acceptability of human enhancement. We propose an alternative, more fine-grained approach. To identify what is morally salient about enhancement technologies, we start from an explicit, minimalist conception of human agents as bounded practical reasoners and of technology as instruments. This conception allows us to catego- rise different effects of technologies on our possi- bilities for action and our evaluation of these possibilities. For each effect that HET can have, we discuss whether it is morally salient and whether it can also be brought about by non-enhancement technologies. We conclude that HET are morally salient in several respects, that not all HET share all those morally salient respects, and that continuities with traditional technologies may be found in all morally salient respects. THE NATURE OF THE DEBATE HET are often loosely specified as technologies that enhance human capacities past their normal level. Commonly used examples are gene therapy, brain implants and smart drugs. The controversy surrounding HET rages on in the popular and academic press. Yet it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to determine what is specifically morally salient about these technologies. Bioconservatives like Kass 1 argue against enhancement technologies by claiming that there is something intrinsically valuable about human nature that will be lost once we enhance ourselves. By enhancing our natural capacities, we may become ‘better ’, but not necessarily ‘better humans’. Leaving aside the problem with spelling out the ‘intrinsic value’ appealed to (eg, see Fukuyama 2 ), the strength of this argument cannot be judged independently of the underlying conception of human nature and its relation to technology. Three kinds of conceptions come to mind, none of which supports a special case against HET. First, one could accept that designing and using technologies is part of human nature. Then, there is no ground for morally questioning any technology based on an appeal to human nature alone. Alternatively, one could maintain that human nature is technology-free. This leads to a general conservativism concerning technology. That attitude has precedents in philosophy (eg, see Borgmann 3 ) and is hardly limited to HET. However, it seems hard to sustain on a closer look at the history of technology. Many technologies have drastically altered human behaviour, yet are now part and parcel of our everyday lives 45 : interven- tions in schooling, exercise and nutrition are prime examples. If there originally were moral qualms concerning these interventions, they have vanished. A third possibility is to characterise human nature by our current capacities, technology-supported or otherwise. Then, the bioconservatives have helped themselves to their conclusion; and moral problems cannot be created by stipulation. Summing up, no view that appeals to human nature supports the conclusion that, morally speaking, there is anything specifically salient about HET. It would be an over-reaction to immediately set aside all intuitive moral qualms regarding HET. Arguments to the contrary, given by trans- humanists, do little to clarify what is at stake in the debate. Take Bostrom’s defence of HET by the claim that there is ‘ no deep moral difference Philosophy & Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands Correspondence to Auke J K Pols, Philosophy & Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, IPO 1.09, PO Box 51, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands; a.j.k.pols@tue.nl 1 Received 10 June 2010 Revised 10 August 2010 Accepted 13 August 2010 Pols AJK, Houkes WN. J Med Ethics (2010). doi:10.1136/jme.2010.038257 1 of 4 Topics: xxx Ethics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128