* Ayça Özdoğan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, 06560, Söğütözü, Ankara, Turkey. E-mail: aozdogan@etu.edu.tr Boğaziçi Journal Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Vol. 30, no. 1 (2016), pp. 1-21 doi:10.21773/boun.30.1.1 A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion Ayça Özdoğan* TOBB University of Economics and Technology Abstract This survey paper presents an extended literature review of strategic communication and persuasion. The goal is to provide a systematic categorization of the different approaches in the literature, accompanied with the discussions of the pioneer and leading papers as well as the frontier research in each of the categories. Keywords: persuasion games, cheap talk, Bayesian persuasion, information disclosure. JEL Classiication: C70, D82, D83. Stratejik İletişim ve İkna Üzerine Bir İnceleme Özet Bu inceleme çalışması, stratejik iletişim ve ikna etme üzerine detaylı bir literatür taraması sunmaktadır. Araştırmanın amacı literatürdeki farklı yaklaşımların sistematik bir sınıflandırmasını yaparken, her bir kategoride öne çıkan çalışmaları, belirleyici ve öncü makaleleri tartışmaları ile ortaya koymaktır. Anahtar Kelimeler: ikna oyunları, ucuz konuşma, Bayesian ikna, bilgi ifşası. JEL Sınıflaması: C70, D82, D83. W ith its widespread applications to the issues such as advertising, lobbying, political campaigning, judicial decision making, gathering information from possibly biased experts, convincing an investor to invest in a project among many others, the question of when or if a person (i.e. sender/speaker) who is better informed about the state of the world can persuade an uninformed decision maker (i.e. receiver/listener) to act in a particular way is of great economic importance. If the receiver knows with what intention the sender is presenting information, could the sender still convince the receiver to change her opinion? Under what conditions (such as veriiability of information, cost of untruthfulness, alignment of preferences) can the receiver be persuaded by the sender, and if such conditions exist, what