Anomality as the Common Denominator Johan Lammers 2014 1 Anomality as the Common Denominator Johan Lammers September 2014 Dr. D.J. Weggemans Researching Terrorism and Counterterrorism The relevance of a scientific inquiry is oft determined by either its breadth of potential application over distinct incidents, or by the depth of meaningful insight it gives in connecting and understanding particular cases. 1 By its nature, the literature on ‘Lone Wolf Terrorism’ (Jackson en Gable 2011) struggles with both dimensions (Spaaij 2010). Furthermore, we can only gather intelligence on the context of such attacks in hindsight (Jackson en Gable 2011, 23-68, 89-100, Nesser 2012, Van Buuren 2012) 2 . For this essay, we refer to Pantucci’s (2011) typology for elaborate definitions of solo-actor categories (Pantucci 2011). By contrast, this essay explains why these distinctions give us little analytical capacity to construct theory unless we connect them to existing “conventional” theoretical frameworks for individuals in the study of terrorism and radicalization 3 . Lone Wolves are distinguished because they are self-directed; anomalies to the network, they lack a connection to a greater hierarchy or command-and-control structure of terrorist activities. 4 Hence, the framework provided by Feldman (2013, 75) makes most sense to define them as self-acting groups; for the purpose of our analysis, it matters little whether they received some help in preparation of their attack or not. Given the plethora of media through which is radical message or instruction can reach such individuals, and that none of them are trained terrorists from birth, one could argue that all ‘wolves’ sought to acquire the expertise they lacked from someone and somewhere. Especially when considering Islamist extremism lone attacks, both the narratives of ‘leaderless resistance and ‘theory of mass action’ make little sense (Kaplan 1997). For the former, those that truly feel part of a community bound by a ‘borderless idea’ (Kaplan 1997, 3-6) have clear perceived superiors 5 . Effectively, this insight makes Loners and Lone Attackers similar save the degree of active/passive their engagement with the ‘mother organization’ was. This group of self-directed actors as a whole though, cannot be defined a ‘leaderless’ (Spaaij 2010). Loners are perhaps best comparable to regular high risk-groups for radicalization, Lone Attackers to general terrorist operatives 6 . Whether they are actively engaged to become foreign fighters, radicalize locally or consume digital material on extremism and terrorist acts is often just a matter of what context is convenient (Pantucci 1 The merit of theory is higher when it is capable of connection a larger population of cases, or when it can connect particular cases in a more novel and insightful way than existing alternative paradigms. 2 This as nearly all of these individuals are socially, economically or culturally disenfranchised from their communities and living environments. 3 Pantucci explains that because in our standard conception terrorism is a group activity, we seek to cluster events isolated by definition into one phenomenon (Pantucci 2011, 2-6). 4 Unlike “regular” terrorists who operate cell-networks, command-and-control structures. Several types may receive instruction or suggestions from such networks, but nonetheless the terrorist organization would not hold direct control over their actions. 5 These superiors either instruct them directly, as we would see by lone attackers such as Richard Reid, or through inspiration and example in a ‘propaganda by the deed’ (Iviansky 1977, Kaplan 1997, Nesser 2012). 6 This in terms of counterterrorism measures available.