Journal of Science Education and Technology, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2004 ( C  2004) A Reconstruction of Structure of the Atom and Its Implications for General Physics Textbooks: A History and Philosophy of Science Perspective Mar´ ıa A. Rodr´ ıguez 1 and Mansoor Niaz 1,2 Recent research in science education has recognized the importance of history and philoso- phy of science. The objective of this study is to evaluate the presentation of the Thomson, Rutherford, and Bohr models of the atom in general physics textbooks based on criteria de- rived from history and philosophy of science. Forty-one general physics textbooks (all pub- lished in the United States) were evaluated on two criteria based on Thomson’s work, three on Rutherford’s work, and three on Bohr’s work. Results obtained show that general physics textbooks do not systematically include a history and philosophy of science perspective. Most textbooks present an inductivist perspective in which experimental details are considered to be paramount. On the contrary, a historical reconstruction of the experimental details in- evitably includes: the context in which an experiment is conducted, the theoretical frame- work that guides the scientist, and alternative interpretations of data that lead to conflicts and controversies. Examples are provided to show how historical reconstructions of atomic models can provide students an opportunity to appreciate how scientists work and science progresses. It is plausible to suggest that textbook presentations based on a history and phi- losophy of science perspective can perhaps arouse students’ interest in the subject and hence lead to greater conceptual understanding. KEY WORDS: history and philosophy of science; structure of the atom; general physics textbooks. INTRODUCTION In an attempt to understand, What is Science?, The American Physical Society has drafted a pol- icy statement, which has been endorsed by the American Association of Physics Teachers (AAPT): “Science is the systematic enterprise of gathering knowledge about the world and organizing and con- densing that knowledge into testable laws and the- ories. The success and credibility of science is an- chored in the willingness of scientists to: (1) ... (2) abandon or modify accepted conclusions when con- fronted with more complete or reliable experimen- 1 Epistemology of Science Group, Department of Chemistry, Uni- versidad de Oriente, Cuman ´ a, Estado Sucre, Venezuela 6101A. 2 To whom correspondence should be addressed; e-mail: niazma @cantv.net tal evidence” (AAPT, 1999, p. 659). For most prac- tical purposes this definition is acceptable. Never- theless, a closer look reveals the problematic na- ture of What is Science?, and hence the need for an epistemological framework based on history and philosophy of science. For example, the emphasis on “gathering knowledge,” i.e., experimental data and “complete or reliable experimental evidence” with no reference to controversy, explanation of data by rival theories, and the tentative nature of scien- tific knowledge, shows the complexity of the issues involved. No wonder, one critic considers that by endorsing this statement the members of the Exec- utive Board of the AAPT had, “... classified them- selves as nonscientists” (Auerbach, 2000, p. 305). Furthermore, on the basis of a history and philoso- phy of science (HPS) perspective, this critic points out that the word “complete” could be construed by 409 1059-0145/04/0900-0409/0 C  2004 Plenum Publishing Corporation