Ukraine and Russia in Crisis: A Polish View Katarzyna Stokłosa In order to comprehend Poland’s support for its Ukrainian neighbour in the Ukraine–Russia conflict, it is important to go back to the difficult Polish–Ukrainian neighbouring relations following the Second World War. The origins of the Polish–Soviet border Poland’s Eastern border is the product of the 1943 Tehran Conference and the Polish–Soviet border agreement of 16 August 1945. Like other Central Eastern European borders, however, this border was not yet definitive. A Polish–Soviet border commission met from 7 March 1946 to 27 April 1947 and agreed on changes. The township of Medyka and some neighbouring villages were granted to the Polish side. However, by the year 1951, at the request of the Soviet Union, a further exchange of territory took place with a far more extensive impact. The Soviet Union had discovered black coal deposits in Bugknie — on the left bank of the Bug River to the west of Sokal between Solokija and the Bug River — and wanted to lay claim to them, no matter what. This region also encompassed fertile farmlands. As compensation, Poland was granted an area of similar size in the Bieszczady region. 1 In the light of the fact that the new Polish–Soviet border was forced upon the general population, it was never truly accepted by the community. Citizens did not feel at home in the new areas and viewed their residence as merely temporary. It was hoped that a pursuant program of propaganda, undertaken by both the Soviet Union and Poland, would lead to the community accepting the border. For example, on the Polish side, Ukrainians were portrayed as perpetual enemies and initiators of mass-murders on Polish soil during the Second World War. It was claimed that the Ukrainians would never forgive the Poles if Lemberg were ever to belong to Poland again. In schools on either side of the border, it was taught that the remaining territories on the Ukrainian side were historically Ukrainian. The former German territories in the East, which had been attached to Poland as a result of decisions at the Potsdam Conference, were portrayed as compensatory regions. During the Communist era, changes of borders became taboo on both an official level and in the academic world, and the subject was never addressed. The subject was either presented as a confirmed fact or attempts were made to justify the reality. 2 The expulsions Like numerous other Central and Eastern–Central European border regions, there were also mass-resettlements at the end of the Second World War in the Polish–Soviet border regions. Millions of Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians and Lemko people were forced to leave their homelands. 3 1. Cf. Stanisław StĊpieĔ, ｵDie polnisch-ukrainische Grenze in den zurückliegenden fünfzig Jahren’ [The Polish–Ukrainian border in the last fifty years], in Grenzen im Ostblock und ihre Überwindung [Borders inside of the Eastern Bloc and their overcoming], ed. Helga Schultz (Berlin: Arno Spitz, 2001), 264. 2. Cf. Katarzyna Stokłosa, Grenzstädte in Ostmitteleuropa. Guben – Gubin 1945–1995 [Border Cities in Central Eastern Europe. Guben-Gubin 1945–1995] (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003), 48–49. 3. Cf. Klaus Ziemer, ‘Osten ist nicht gleich Osten. Die Beziehungen Polens zur Ukraine, zu Weißrußland und Litauen’ [East is not the same as East. Poland’s relations towards Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania], in Schwierige Nachbarschaften. Die Ostpolitik der Staaten Ostmitteleuropas [Difficult neighbourhoods. Eastern policy of Central Eastern European states], ed. Klaus Ziemer (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2001), 57–75. Gerhard Besier & Katarzyna Stokłosa: Neighbourhood Perceptions of the Ukraine Crisis: From the Soviet Union into Eurasia?, Routledge Post-Soviet Politics Series, 2017, ISBN 978-1-4724-8494-9