AKP’s Machiavellian Victory: How It Happened and What It Means for Turkey Karabekir Akkoyunlu* 12 November 2015 Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey) Abstract After five months in uncharted waters, Turkey’s future suddenly looks more predictable and familiar: no more talk of a coalition as the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) (AKP) will keep ruling alone and press with its socio-economic and political agenda. Following a moment of fluidity between the June poll and the repeat election in November, Turkey’s transformation into a competitive authoritarian regime under a dominant party rule once again seems on track. This paper asks how and why this turnabout came about and examines the legacy of the two elections, and the chaotic period in between, for Turkey’s society and politics. *** In less than five months, Turkey’s voters delivered two election results that have disproved most polls and stunned observers. Few people had anticipated the pro-Kurdish leftist Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples’ Democratic Party) (HDP) and the far- right Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) (MHP) to win as big as they did in the June election and to deny the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) (AKP) the mandate to govern alone for the first time in 13 years. That poll led to a protracted government crisis and a snap re-run election on 1 November in an environment of intense polarisation, violence and conflict, especially in the Kurdish southeast. This time, even senior AKP figures were caught off guard by the speed and decisiveness with which their party recaptured its lost votes and mandate.[1] After five months in uncharted waters, Turkey’s future suddenly looks more predictable and familiar: no more talk of a coalition as the AKP will keep ruling alone. It will press with its socio-economic and political agenda, including mega infrastructure projects and a constitutional referendum to replace the existing parliamentary system with strong presidentialism. Now that the election is over, we can expect the conflict with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistani’s (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) (PKK) to ease gradually and the “peace process” to come out of “the freezer” where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan placed it after the June election.[2] The rules of political competition will be tweaked further to favour the ruling party, so that space for tolerated dissent will continue to shrink, either by force or by the quiet persuasion of the AKP’s show of power. Disgruntled senior figures within the AKP are also less likely to speak up now that President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have strengthened their grip over the party apparatus. In short, following a brief moment of fluidity, Turkey’s transformation into a competitive authoritarian regime under a dominant party rule goes on as before. But how did this dramatic turnaround come about and what is the legacy of the five chaotic months in between the two elections for Turkey’s society and politics?