On National Self-determination MARGARET MOORE Ã University of Waterloo, Canada This paper argues in favour of a conception of self-determination which involves the equal recognition of dierent national identities. It proceeds by, ®rst, criticizing the dominant territorial (in contrast to national) conception of self-determination. It then addresses three main criticisms of a principle of national self-determination. These are (1) the argument from indeterminacy; (2) the argument from instability; (3) the problem of overlapping nationalities. This paper argues in favour of a conception of self-determination which involves the equal recognition of dierent national identities. It argues that the claim of a nation to political self-expression should amount to a defensible right, equally possessed by all nations, and that this claim derives from the mere existence of a nation (and does not rest on past injustice or present discrimina- tion). 1 The paper is divided into two sections. Part one suggests various di- culties ± in international law, political practice and philosophical coherence ± with the dominant territorial (in contrast to national) conception of self- determination. It argues that international law is riddled with inconsistencies and is ethically unconvincing; that political practice based on this territorial conception of self-determination has failed to generate rules and mechanisms adequate for resolving national con¯ict; and that the philosophical under- pinnings of the territorial conception are also problematic. In part two, some of the main objections to a principle of national self- determination are considered. One of the reasons why the principle of self- determination has been conceptualized in territorial terms has been because of (perceived) problems surrounding a principle of national self-determination. The paper addresses three criticisms most commonly made of the principle of national self-determination. These are (i) the argument from indeterminacy; (ii) the argument from instability; and (iii) the problem of overlapping nationalities. I suggest a solution to the problem of indeterminacy, viz., the claim that the idea of self-determination is indeterminate in the sense that it #Political Studies Association 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Ã The author would like to thank R. Beiner, J. McGarry, W. Norman, the participants of the Toronto chapter for the Study of Political Thought and the anonymous referees for Political Studies for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. She is grateful to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for ®nancial support and H. Ristau for research assistance. 1 This is in contrast to A. Buchanan's argument in Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder CO, Westview, 1991). Buchanan dismisses the idea of national self-determination, arguing instead that the strongest justi®catory argument for secession is when liberal precepts of justice have been violated. Political Studies (1997), XLV, 900±913