M. Brigaglia, B. Celano Reasons, rules, exceptions: towards a psychological account Paper presented at the workshop on “Reason(s) in Law”, University of Genova, December 5-6, 2016. Draft. Please do not quote 1. Introduction We shall sketch and defend a psychological account of rule-based reasoning and decision-making, specifically of the relationship between rules and exceptions. We will proceed as follows. The topic of our inquiry are the relations between rules, the reasons underlying them, and exceptions. In analysing these relations, we shall, first, outline an apparent paradox, the “paradox of rules”, and a related problem, the “problem of reconsideration”. Then, we shall propose a solution to, or better dissolution of, the paradox, grounded in an account of the psychological processes underlying rule- application and reconsideration. We shall, that is, claim that the problem of reconsideration should be answered by appealing to matters of sheer psychological fact. The upshot of this argument is a psychologistic conception of rules and of rule-based reasoning and decision-making. We will explain what we mean by “psychologism” and why, to our minds, a psychologistic theory of rules and of rule-based reasoning and decision-making is on the right track. What does this all matter to jurisprudence? We simply do not know. But we have the strong feeling that, if we are right, this cannot be devoid of far-reaching implications for legal theory. 2. Two-Tier Theories Many contemporary theories of law, and of practical reasoning, share the aspiration of developing a two-tier account – i.e., an account (of law, or of practical reasoning) based on the distinction between, on the one hand, rules (protected reasons for action 1 ; entrenched prescriptive generalizations 2 ) and, on the other hand, the reasons underlying them (sometimes called, at least some of them, “principles”; we shall follow this usage here, but it should be kept in mind that the term “principle” is, 1 Raz 1979, ch. 1. 2 Schauer 1991.