Doing Without "Disorder" in the Study of Psychopathology Harold Kincaid Faucher, Luc and Forest, Denis, forthcoming, Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and his Critics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jerome Wakefield has made major contributions to thinking about psychiatric classification, contributions that have important ramifications for the practice of psychiatry and related disciplines. 1 I argue in this chapter that those contributions are independent of his own views about the nature of psychopathology. Wakefield's picture of psychopathology on my view relies on dubious assumptions about the methods, aims and abilities of philosophy; his account of psychopathology and the disciplines that study and treat it oversimplifies a complex reality. Nonetheless, these criticisms do not undermine Wakefield's contributions because those contributions do not depend on his specific account of psychopathology and, moreover, his oversimplifications point to a fruitful research agenda. In section 1 I outline some of what I take to be some of Wakefield's main contributions. Those contributions center around the recognition that the behaviors that get labelled as psychopathology are a heterogeneous lot, with important theoretical and practical consequences following. Section 2 argues that psychiatry does not need a foundation in a conceptual analysis of mental disorder and that searching for such an analysis rests on a mistaken philosophical project. Using evolutionary considerations to identify mental disorders is the topic of section 3. Wakefield's actual points about the different behaviors that get labelled psychopathological are not actually supported by evolutionary accounts of mental disorders and the prospects and uses for such accounts are limited. Section 4 sketches an alternative pluralist view of psychopathology that makes the search for objective explanatory classifications of psychopathology paramount, a goal inspired by and consistent with