Carlos Steel (Leuven) Soul and Matter as the Place of Forms. Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle, De anima III 4, 429a27-9 I χὄiὅtotle’ὅ pὄaiὅe of thoὅe who call the ὅoul the ‘place of foὄmὅ’ In Chapter III 4 of his treatise On the Soul, when discussing the nature of the receptive intellect, Aristotle makes a cryptic reference to some people who call the ὅoul ‘the place of foὄmὅ’μ They say well who say that the soul is ‘the place of forms’ (IJȩπȠȞ İį૵Ȟ), though thiὅ doeὅ not hold of the whole ὅoul, but only of the intellective soul, and it is the forms not actually, but potentially. 1 Who aὄe theὅe ȜȑȖȠȞIJİȢς ἧὅually χὄiὅtotle’ὅ ὄemaὄk iὅ ὅeen aὅ a reference to Plato. There is, however, no passage in the dialogues where ἢlato compaὄeὅ the ὅoul to a ‘place’ to ὄeceive the foὄmὅέ ώickὅ and Ross refer to Parm. 132b, where Socrates suggests that the forms come about as ȞȘȝαIJα in the soul, but this view is rejected by Parmenides. 2 1 Aristotle, DA III 4, 429a27-29: țα੿ İ੣ į੽ Ƞ ȜȑȖȠȞIJİȢ IJ੽Ȟ ȥυȤ੽Ȟ İἶȞαȚ πȜ੽Ȟ ੖IJȚ Ƞ੡IJİ ੖ȜȘ ἀȜȜ’ ਲ ȞȠȘIJȚțȒ, Ƞ੡IJİ ਥȞIJİȜİȤİȓᾳ ἀȜȜ੹ įυȞȐȝİȚ IJ੹ İἴįȘ. 2 Robert Drew Hicks: Aristotle. De Anima. Cambridge 1907, pp. 482: “no one particular passage can be cited for this expression, but it is quite in the spirit of Plato's idealism.” Hicks refers to Parm. 132b, where the young Socrates ὅuggeὅtὅ that the foὄmὅ come about ‘in ouὄ ὅoulὅ’, but he admitὅ that thiὅ view iὅ rejected in the discussion. William David Ross: Aristotle. De Anima, Oxford 1961, p. 292 refers to the same passage, but believes that Aristotle does not refer to Plato himself, but to some people in his school.