The Power of Humility in Sceptical Religion: Why Ietsism Is Preferable to J.L. Schellenberg’s Ultimism This paper is published as a FirstView article in the journal Religious Studies, and copyright is owned by Cambridge University Press. It can be found at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10011088&fileId=S0034412515000475 Please reference the published version in any academic correspondence. JAMES ELLIOTT Department of Philosophy, Purdue University 100 N. University St., West Lafayette, Indiana 47907 USA elliotj@purdue.edu Abstract: J.L. Schellenberg’s vision for Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes “Ultimism” – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object toward which the skeptical religionist should assent. In this paper I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. Firstly, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Secondly, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. A good youth … ought not to despise humility, but should love forbearance and modesty. -- St. Ambrose, on the intellectual formation of children in the church. 1