SPECIAL FOCUS: GOVERNANCE OF NANOBIOTECHNOLOGY Nanotechnology, voluntary oversight, and corporate social performance: does company size matter? Jennifer Kuzma • Aliya Kuzhabekova Received: 5 January 2011 / Accepted: 13 January 2011 / Published online: 28 January 2011 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract In this article, we examine voluntary oversight programs for nanotechnology in the context of corporate social performance (CSP) in order to better understand the drivers, barriers, and forms of company participation in such programs. At the theoretical level, we use the management framework of CSP to understand the voluntary behavior of companies. At the empirical level, we investigate nanotech industry participation in the Environmental Protection Agency’s Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program (NMSP) as an example of CSP, in order to examine the effects of company characteristics on CSP outcomes. The analysis demonstrates that, on the average, older and larger companies for which nano- tech is one of the many business activities demonstrate greater CSP as judged by company actions, declara- tions, and self-evaluations. Such companies tended to submit more of the requested information to the NMSP, including specific information about health and safety, and to claim fewer of the submitted items as confidential business information. They were also more likely to have on-line statements of generic and nano-specific corporate social responsibility princi- ples, policies, and achievements. The article suggests a need to encourage smaller and younger companies to participate in voluntary oversight programs for nano- technology and presents options for better design of these programs. Keywords Nanotechnology Á Oversight Á Corporate social responsibility Á Governance Introduction Nanotechnology could have great benefits to society in the improvement of drugs, pesticide delivery, renewable energy systems, and the quality and safety of food. However, many nanomaterials also present special properties that are likely to require extra scrutiny to ensure human health and environmental safety. Nanomaterials may penetrate more readily in living systems and pose greater health effects at lower concentrations, given their smaller size, higher surface area to mass ration, and quantum and electric properties (Maynard 2006). Thus, many scholars have argued for the need for specific attention and regimes for the oversight of nanotechnology products (Davies 2007; Kuzma 2006; Macoubrie 2005, 2006; Marchant et al. 2008; Maynard 2006; Sylvester et al. 2009). Until recently, much of the discussion on nano- technology oversight has been focused on formal, mandatory, or ‘‘hard’’ regulation. The general con- clusion of the discussion is that a formal regula- tory system will be difficult to design given the J. Kuzma (&) Á A. Kuzhabekova Center for Science, Technology and Public Policy, Hubert Humphrey Institute for Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA e-mail: kuzma007@umn.edu 123 J Nanopart Res (2011) 13:1499–1512 DOI 10.1007/s11051-011-0235-0