Replacing the Moral Foundations: An Evolutionary-Coalitional Theory of Liberal-Conservative Differences Jeffrey S. Sinn Winthrop University Matthew W. Hayes Winthrop University Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains liberal-conservative differences as arising from different moral intuitions, with liberals endorsing “individualizing” foundations (Harm and Fairness) and conservatives also endorsing “binding” foundations (Authority, Respect, and Purity). We argue these labels misconstrue ideological differences and propose Evolutionary-Coalitional Theory (ECT) as an alternative, explaining how competitive dynamics in the ancestral social environment could produce the observed ideological differences. We test ECT against MFT across three studies. Study 1 shows the so-called “binding” orientation entails the threat-sensitivity and outgroup antagonism predicted by ECT; that is, an authoritarian motive. Similarly, Study 2 shows the so-called “individualizing” orientation is better described as a universalizing motive, one reflecting a broader set of moral commitments (e.g., to nature) and a broader sociality than the egocentrism implied by MFT. Study 3 provides a factor analysis reducing “binding” to authoritarianism and “individualizing” to universalism, with the latter loading against social dominance orientation (SDO). A hierarchical regression then provides additional evidence for ECT, showing this dominating motive (SDO) accounts for variance in conservatism that MFT leaves unexplained. Collectively, these three studies suggest that ECT offers a more accurate and precise explanation of the key psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. KEY WORDS: ideology, moral foundations, evolutionary psychology, coalitional theory Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) attempts to explain all moral motivation and the differences between liberals and conservatives with five moral foundations. According to MFT, liberals rely pri- marily on two “individualizing” foundations (Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity), whereas conser- vatives rely on these plus three additional “binding” foundations (Authority/Respect, Ingroup/ Loyalty, and Purity/Sanctity). MFT proposes this distinction as a new platform for ideological research (Graham et al., 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012). 1 Critics, however, suggest MFT misconstrues both morality and ideology. Dyadic morality researchers suggest all moral judgment invokes a dyadic template (i.e., agent-harming-patient), 1 We hereafter refer to each couplet by the first term. MFT scholars revised these labels in 2012 to Care/harm, Fairness/ cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2013). We use the labels from the major validation study (Graham et al., 2011) and the primary ideology study (Graham et al., 2009). 1 0162-895X V C 2016 International Society of Political Psychology Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia Political Psychology, Vol. xx, No. xx, 2016 doi: 10.1111/pops.12361