dialectica Vol. 60, N° 1 (2006), pp. 79–84 DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01046.x © 2005 The Author. Journal compilation © 2005 Editorial Board of dialectica Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge? Notes and Discussion Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge? Kelly Becker † ABSTRACT Jonathan Vogel has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism (CR) cannot account for higher-level knowledge that one’s belief is true, or not false. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid. Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel’s argument, which squares CR with higher-level knowledge both that one’s belief is true and that one’s belief is not false. I argue that, while Vogel’s argument reveals the incompatibility of CR and knowledge of certain higher-level propositions, it does not establish the general claim that CR is incompatible with knowledge that any of one’s beliefs is true, or not false. Jonathan Vogel (2000) has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism (CR) cannot account for higher-level knowledge. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid, and it does indeed show that higher-level knowledge of a particular type of proposition is incompatible with CR. Specifi- cally, Vogel argues that CR cannot make room for knowledge that one’s belief that p is not false, from which it follows, he claims, ‘that you also fail to know that your belief is true’ (611), hence that CR ‘makes it impossible for you to know that any of your beliefs is true, not false’ (ibid.). Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel’s argument, which squares CR with higher-level knowl- edge both that one’s belief is true and that one’s belief is not false. It follows that, while Vogel’s argument reveals the incompatibility of CR and knowledge of certain higher-level propositions, it does not establish the general claim that CR is incompatible with knowledge that any of one’s beliefs is true, or not false. Thus even though Vogel’s argument raises an important problem for CR, things are not as bad for the CR theorist as originally advertised. Moreover, I will explain how Vogel’s crucial premise hinges on a translation into a logical sym- bolism that is a prima facie incorrect rendering of its natural language higher- level belief counterpart. † University of New Mexico, Albaquerque, NM 87131, USA; Email: kbecker@unm.edu