arguments. Hence, the value cannot contain the arguments and func- tions as parts. Gaskin argues that one can combine both models: [W]hat is to stop us conceiving of a whole that is given to us as such – given in such a way that we can discern its (unique) parts and their structuring – as arising from the application of a function that, by virtue of operating on these parts (the function itself being conceived as a part) unifies them into the whole we have before us? (100) What stops us, among other things, is that functions cannot be con- ceived of as parts of wholes. Assume for reductio that the plus function is a part of the whole referred to by ‘7 + 5’. How can the plus function compose with 7 and 5 this whole and compose with other numbers infinitely many further distinct wholes? Do all numbers overlap each other? Such questions are better avoided than answered. 4. Frege Exegesis. Gaskin argues against the Fregean strategy to solve the unity problem that invokes unsaturated ‘things’, especially Fregean concepts. One of the reasons Gaskin gives is that there is no viable distinction between (complete) objects and (incomplete) con- cepts. Gaskin’s arguments for the latter thesis ignore Frege’s view that the relation of identity only hold between objects, not between concepts. (For instance, Frege, G. Posthumous Writings, 120). Gaskin takes Frege to waver between an intensionalist understanding of concepts and an extensionalist one according to which ‘concepts are identical provided that they have the same extension’ (37). But for Frege concepts are not identical by any criterion. And this may be an important reason to distinguish between concepts and objects. Mark Textor mark.textor@kcl.ac.uk Hegel and the Analytic Tradition Edited by Angelica Nuzzo London: Continuum, 2010, pp. vii+208 ISBN 9781441139504. £65 doi:10.1017/S0031819110000501 One of the challenges facing a volume entitled Hegel and the Analytic Tradition and aiming to encourage dialogue across the ‘analytic–con- tinental divide’ is that the notion of an ‘analytic tradition’ might seem more meaningful for Hegelians than for the analysts themselves. With analysis’s tendency towards an ahistorical, ‘naturalistic’ self- conception, many analytic philosophers may doubt that they belong, in any meaningful sense, to a ‘tradition’ with a ‘history’. 567 Reviews