The effects of attributions of intent and apology on forgiveness: When saying sorry may not help the story q C. Ward Struthers a, * , Judy Eaton b , Alexander G. Santelli a , Melissa Uchiyama a , Nicole Shirvani a a Department of Psychology, York University, 238 BSB, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ont., Canada M3J 1P3 b Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford Campus, 73 George St., Brantford, Ont., Canada N3T 2Y3 article info Article history: Received 6 February 2007 Revised 26 February 2008 Available online 6 March 2008 Keywords: Attributions of intent Apology Impressions Forgiveness abstract Despite the oft-cited positive effects of an apology on forgiveness, forgiveness does not always follow. In three studies we tested the ironic notion that, following an interpersonal transgression, an apology fol- lowing an attribution of intent might further hinder, rather than benefit, the forgiveness process. The findings of three studies were systematically replicated and supported our primary prediction that, fol- lowing attributions of intent, saying sorry does not always lead to forgiveness. When offenders intention- ally committed a transgression, forgiveness was less likely following an apology. However, when offenses were unintentional, forgiveness was more likely following an apology. We also showed that these effects were explained by participants’ impression of the transgressor. Ó 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Although often harmonious in nature, relationships are some- times hindered by interpersonal offenses that can easily escalate into more serious and intractable conflicts. Despite the potential damage that transgressions can cause, relationships are not always irreparably damaged by them. Forgiveness is one process that dem- onstrates promise in rebuilding relationships interrupted by inter- personal conflict (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Eaton & Struthers, 2006; Fincham, 2000; McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003; Ohbu- chi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). As a motivated decision by victims of an offense to let go of their legitimate right to anger and resentment toward the transgressor and to evaluate the offender favorably, for- giveness is believed to be a process that is influenced by two catego- ries of social cognitive factors. On the one hand, certain intrapersonal factors situated within injured parties such as their attributions for the transgressors’ responsibility for the offense can influence for- giveness (Eaton, Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Fincham, 2000; McCul- lough et al., 2003; Weiner, 2006; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). On the other hand, forgiveness is also influenced by interpersonal fac- tors located outside of the injured party, such as an apology from the offender (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Frantz & Bennigson, 2005; Weiner, Graham, Peter, & Zmuidinas, 1991). Research examining these influencing factors suggests that individuals are more likely to forgive a transgressor if they avoid holding the transgressor responsible for the offense and if the transgressor is apologetic. Notwithstanding the potential benefits of these factors in facil- itating the forgiveness process, forgiveness is not always possible (Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003). Given the poten- tially damaging consequences of transgressions and the potentially beneficial consequences of forgiveness on relationships, it is important to better understand the boundary conditions and mechanisms under which the forgiveness process operates. Some scholars have argued that victims may only be able to forgive those who have directly harmed them (Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998), whereas others have proposed that it may be morally wrong to forgive certain offenses such as murder, sexual abuse, and geno- cide (Minow, 1998; Wiesenthal, 1998), and still others have noted that the severity of the offense and justice values may be crucial to the forgiveness process (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992; Exline et al., 2003; Karremans & Van Lange, 2004). Another factor that is related to the degree of responsibility inferred for an offense and might explain why, following a judgment of responsibility, some offenses are more or less forgiv- able is an injured party’s attributions of a transgressor’s intentions (Fincham & Jasper, 1980; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Malle 0022-1031/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.02.006 q This research was generously supported by Doctoral Fellowships to Judy Eaton and Alexander Santelli and Standard Research Grants to Ward Struthers and Judy Eaton from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Study 1 was based on Melissa Uchiyama’s Honors Thesis under the supervision of Ward Struthers. The authors thank James Lapierre who served as the confederate in Study 1. The authors also thank Ward Struthers’ social motivation research group for their valuable help in designing and conducting this research. The authors thank Bernie Weiner and Udo Rudolph for comments on an earlier draft of this research. * Corresponding author. E-mail address: struther@yorku.ca (C.W. Struthers). Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 983–992 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Experimental Social Psychology journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp