Why the “Haves” Do Not Necessarily Come Out Ahead in Informal Dispute Resolution SHARON GILAD This article explores the implications of Galanter’s distinction between repeat and one-off players to informal dispute resolution settings. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data regarding one British “private-Ombudsman” scheme, the article analyzes the extent to which complaint handlers’ decision making advantaged more experienced and better resourced firms and/or high-status and more asser- tive complainants. The article’s tentative theoretical proposition is that the typi- cally indeterminate nature of informal dispute resolution settings renders them less susceptible to large organizations’ and other repeat players’ capacity to “play for rules.” Yet, this indeterminacy makes such processes more vulnerable to decision makers’ reliance on heuristics. INTRODUCTION Since the 1970s, the Scandinavian Ombudsman institution has diffused rapidly, copied and modified to handle citizens and consumers’ complaints against governments and private firms in Europe and beyond. Ombudsmen aspire and publicly claim to provide the public with more than mere alter- natives to the civil courts and tribunals. They do not perceive themselves as inferior substitutes to the courts, but rather as ones that provide unique advantages, which avoid some of the limitations of the adversarial legal system. For example, Ann Abraham, the British Parliamentary Ombudsman, summarized some of the common assertions regarding the unique nature of the Ombudsman institution, at least as perceived in the British Isles: although Ombudsman schemes may have plenty in common with the courts and tribunals, they are far from perfect clones of them . . . Where the law . . . has traditionally been characterised by formality, the observance of rigorous rules of evidence, adversarial processes and the binding authority of precedent, Ombudsman practice . . . has always prized its relative informality, its common-sense approach to evidence, its inquisitorial process and its capac- I thank Natalia Letki, Roland Meeks, and the anonymous referees for their useful comments; any mistakes are mine. Address correspondence to Sharon Gilad, Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR), the London School of Economics, London, UK. E-mail: s.gilad@lse.ac.uk. LAW & POLICY, Vol. 32, No. 3, July 2010 ISSN 0265–8240 © 2010 The Author Journal compilation © 2010 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary