MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL EXPRESSIVISM B B : Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self-standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism. Let (metaethical) moral absolutism be the view that all moral statements have truth values simpliciter (or relative to a world), and let (metaethical) moral relativism (broadly construed) be the view that at least some moral statements have truth values that are relative to the standards of a speaker or assessor. 1 Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. 2 However, I will argue here that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolut- ism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral Berit Brogaard is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy and Center for Neurodynamics, University of Missouri, St. Louis. Her publications have appeared in journals such as Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Studies, Philo- sophy and Phenomenological Research, Noûs, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Consciousness and Cognition, Cognitive Science, and Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Her book, Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions, appeared in 2012 with Oxford University Press. In her academic research, she specializes in philosophy of language, perception, consciousness, and emotions. 1 Strictly speaking, we ought to call the views “metaethical moral absolutism” and “meta- ethical moral relativism.” But I will adopt the standard terminology here. Relativism is also sometimes referred to as “subjectivism.” 2 Supporters include Harman (1975), Williams (1981; 1985, ch. 9), Dreier (1990), Copp (1995), Unger (1995), Wong (1996), Brogaard (2003, 2008), Norcross (2005a, 2005b), and Egan (2012). The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 50, Issue 4 December 2012 The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 50, Issue 4 (2012), 538–56. ISSN 0038-4283, online ISSN 2041-6962. DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00141.x 538