Political Studies zyxwvu (1986), zyxwvut XXXIV, 285-295 The Impact of Campaign Contributions on Legislative Outcomes in Congress: Evidence from a House Committee z JOHN E. OWENS* Polytechnic of Central London Introduction Political scientists have debated for over 50 years the major factors involved in legislative decision-making in Congress. Some believe the most important con- siderations are how congressmen’s personal views and ethics affect their actions. Others emphasize the effect of pressure from, for example, party leaders, constituency representatives and interest groups on decision-making. Not surprisingly, given the dominant institutional norms and division of labour in Congress during this period, those analysts who emphasized the r61e of interest groups have focused their attention on Congress’ standing committees where, it is claimed, interest groups’ preferences find particular favour. When Congress passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act in 1971, requiring more complete disclosure of members’ sources and expenditures of funds, it also provided protagonists in this debate with a new arena in which to test their alternative theories. Following the implementation of the Federal Elections Campaign Act on 7 April 1972, the political reform organization, Common Cause, began to compute the first really comprehensive data on congressmen’s campaign con- tributions. It also used the data in a number of case studies intended to demon- strate the positive impact of special interest money on congressional outcomes.’ In these studies, and elsewhere, it was argued that contributions by special interests were essentially ‘contributions with a legislative purpose’. More elaborately, the senior vice-president, Fred Wertheimer, has argued: Although the process of PAC influence usually is subtle, and articulated quid pro quos are rare, the interrelationship between organized lobbying and PAC contributions is clear to the participants. PAC campaign giving provides special interests with access and influence, and it affects legislative decisions zyxwvuts . . . Candidates receive contributions from groups that have legislative interests pending in Congress-often interests of enormous * This research was conducted with financial assistance provided by the American Politics Group of Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom and the paper presented at their Oxford conference, 3-5 Jan. 1986. I See, for example, Common Cause, How Money zyxw Talks in Congress (Washington, D.C., Common Cause, 1978). 0032-3217/86/02/0285-11/$03.00 zyxwvu 0 1986 Political Srudies