Perceiving other agents: Passive experience for seeing the other body as the other’s body （23） In opposition to the standard accounts in modern philosophy of mind, the perceptual accounts of knowledge of other minds hold that we can sometimes perceive another person’s mental states in her bodily actions, gestures or facial expressions (e.g. Cassam 2007, Gallagher 2001, 2005, 2012a, Ratcliffe 2007). I will call such mental episodes other- perception where we directly experience the other in a particular mental state in seeing his or her bodily behavior. The experience of other-perception presents us not only with the other’s mental states, but also with the very presence of the other agent, subject, mind, self, consciousness or person in or with its body. How is it possible, however, to feel the presence of the other experiential agent simply by seeing its bodily behavior? One thing we can immediately note is that we must be aware of both the difference and the sameness of our own body and the other body to have this feeling. Without the awareness of the difference between them, on the one hand, the other body would present itself as another body of our own; hence, we would fail to experience the presence of the other agent. Without the awareness of the sameness between them, on the other hand, the other body would not present itself as involving an agent just as our own body involves ourselves as its agent; so again, we would fail to feel the presence of the other agent in its body. 1 I will not attempt in the following to elucidate both these aspects of other-perception. Rather, I will only try to clarify what it means to experience the sameness between our own body and the other body therein. To this end, I will first introduce an argument that seems to show the impossibility of experiencing our own body and the other body as of the same kind in other- perception, and so of perceiving the other body as the other’s body. This will help us understand what needs to be explained to understand the possibility of having this sort of experience (Section 1). After that, I will demonstrate the possibility of feeling the sameness between our own body and the other body by drawing on the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis in his essay “The philosopher and his shadow (Le philosophe et son ombre)” (Merleau-Ponty 1960) (Section 2&3). Finally, I will outline the implications of this view in regards to the relation between two modes of interpersonal relationships, second-person interaction and third-person observation. The enactive approach to social cognition suggests that the second-person Perceiving other agents：Passive experience for seeing the other body as the other’s body Katsunori Miyahara