RESPONSES Psychotherapy and Science: A Reply to Joseph Schwartz David Livingstone Smith I would like to offer a brief reply to Joseph Schwartz's paper `Is physics a good model for psychoanalysis? Reflections on Langs and Badalamenti' (British Journal of Psychotherapy 11(4), pp. 594-600). Schwartz's paper is itself a contribution to a series of papers discussing the work of Langs and Badalamenti (Burgoyne 1994; Harris 1994; Langs & Badalamenti 1994a, 1994b). All too often contentious contributions to the psychotherapeutic literature are politely ignored (I use `psychotherapy' as a generic term inclusive of psychoanalysis). It is refreshing to find that intense and sustained scientific and philosophical debate is encouraged within the pages of this Journal. Schwartz critizes Langs and Badalamenti on several fronts. Roughly half of Schwartz's paper is taken up with technical comments on their handling of models derived from physics (and applied to psychoanalytic data). Schwartz, a physicist by training, is well equipped to discuss such issues whereas I, in my ignorance of mathematics and physics, am not. I will therefore refrain from commenting on these elements of his paper. Schwartz also provides some ad hominem criticism and some reflections on the issue of the scientificity of psychoanalysis, the latter of which will be my main concern. On the ad hominem front, Schwartz objects to what he calls the flamboyant and unrestrained tone of Langs and Badalamenti's paper. This is fine as an expression of Schwartz's impatience but carries little cognitive significance. The style and tone of a paper have no intrinsic relationship to the value of its content. In fairness, Schwartz seems to concede this point. On the philosophical front, Schwartz claims, without any presentation of evidence or any gesture towards providing any supporting argument, that: For me Langs seems to reify the unconscious - to turn a mental process, the unconscious, into a thing - while at the same time his technique seems to me to have the danger of leaving the client isolated and in an anxious, persecuted state. (p. 597) Schwartz goes on to say that: But then, coming from a Sullivanian tradition, I would say that, wouldn't I? The question is how we constructively resolve theoretical and clinical differences such as these? In other words, Schwartz has engagingly used his own discomfort with Langs's topographical and clinical notions to point out that discomfort does not provide grounds for a rational critique of psychotherapeutic claims. Conversely, conviction cannot rationally underwrite the truth of psychotherapeutic claims. I wholeheartedly endorse this position. Both Schwartz and I interpret science as a (largely) David Livingstone Smith is the Director of Regent's College's MA in Psychotherapy and Counselling. Address for correspondence: School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, Regent's College, Inner Circle, Regent's Park, London NW1 4NS. British Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol 12(3), 1996 © The author