Symbolic Interaction, Volume 26, Number 2, pages 239–262, ISSN 0195-6086; online ISSN 1533-8665. © 2003 by the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223. Direct correspondence to Thomas J. Scheff, Department of Sociology, Ellison Hall, Room 2833,University of California–Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9430; email : scheftj@cox.net. Shame in Self and Society Thomas J. Scheff University of California, Santa Barbara This article proposes that shame is the master emotion of everyday life but is usually invisible in modern societies because of taboo. A review of shame studies suggests a taboo that results in denial and silence. The studies by Cooley, Freud, Elias, Lynd, Goffman, Lewis, and Tomkins have been largely ignored. Their work suggests a vital connection between shame and social life: shame can be seen as a signal of a threat to the bond. If so, understanding shame would be necessary for the study of social systems. The taboo on shame in English still holds: current usage, for the most part, assigns an intense and narrow singular meaning. This mean- ing offends, on the one hand, and misses the everyday function of shame, on the other. Perhaps the problem can be approached, as it is in traditional societies, by the use of a broader term, such as “bond affect” or “Shame.” Such a concept could lead to discovery of the emotional/relational world. Emotion has long been recognized in sociology as crucially important, but most ref- erences to it are generalized and vague. In this article, I specically nominate shame as the premier social emotion. Many sociological theorists have implied that emotions are a powerful force. 1 Al- though Weber did not refer to emotions directly, his emphasis on values as the foun- dation of social structure implies them, since values are emotionally charged beliefs. Durkheim implicated collective sentiments in the creation of solidarity through moral community. Parsons promoted emotion to a component of social action in his AGIL scheme (Parsons and Shils 1955). Even Marx and Engels involved emotions in class tensions and in the solidarity of rebellious classes. But classic formulations have led nowhere because they concerned emotions in general. Our knowledge of emotions is not generalized but particular. For example, we believe we know a great deal about anger: sources from which it arises, different forms it can take, and some of its outcomes. We also have similar kinds of beliefs about other primary emotions, such as fear, grief, shame, contempt, disgust, love, and joy.