Abstract In this analysis of Marcia Baron’s account of excuses, I seek to do two- things. I try to draw out the nature of the distinction between forgiving and excusing. I also defend the distinction between excuses (like duress), and denials of respon- sibility (like insanity). Keywords Excuse Æ Forgiveness Æ Exemption Æ Reasons Æ Justification Æ Responsibility The importance of Marcia Baron’s contribution is that it looks in a highly sophis- ticated and broad-ranging way at excuses, by reviving Austin’s approach in his justly famous paper, ‘A Plea for Excuses’ (Austin, 1979). In recent years, anxious to underline the legal payoffs their analysis is meant to have, many scholars have overlooked the wider significance of excusing in non-legal contexts. Following Austin, Baron considers a whole raft of excusatory practices (and their relationship with other largely non-legal practices such as forgiving) and her analysis is much the richer in consequence. In re-tracing Austin’s steps, she seeks to look at the concepts of justification and excuse ‘as they arise in everyday life’. That raises an initial question of methodology: is this a good place to start? 1 Language and moral judgement in ‘ordinary life’ For Baron, ‘the concepts of justification and excuse should function in law at least roughly the way they do in everyday life’. 1 This claim is liable to lead one into J. Horder (&) Law Commission for England and Wales, Conquest House, 37–38 John Street, Thobalds Road, London WC1N 2BQ, UK e-mail: Jeremy.Horder@LAWCOMMISSION.GSI.GOV.UK 1 Baron 2006: n. 1. She qualifies the claim in important respects. I shall henceforth refer to her paper by reference to the section number (e.g. ‘s. 6.2’) in which the relevant passage is to be found. 123 Crim Law and Philos (2007) 1:41–47 DOI 10.1007/s11572-006-9002-1 ORIGINAL PAPER Excuses in law and in morality: a response to Marcia Baron Jeremy Horder Published online: 14 November 2006 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006