1 The Museum Pass Game and its Value* Victor Ginsburgh° and Israel Zang°° May 2002 Abstract We discuss a subscription game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time subscription or access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services. In this game, a natural way to allocate the subscription income among the service providers is by using the Shapley value. We show that, for the particular game considered, the Shapley value takes a very intuitive and computationally simple form. Published Games and Economic Behavior 43 (2003), 322-325. * We are indebted to Abraham Neyman, Dov Samet, Yair Tauman and Shlomo Weber for helpful discussions and comments. Special thanks go to the Conseil Bruxellois des Musées for introducing us to the problem. Israel Zang’s research was supported by a Research in Brussels 2001 grant from the Brussels capital region. ° ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain ( vginsbur@ulb.ac.be). °° Faculty of Management, the Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University ( zangis@post.tau.ac.il).