A NIT-picking analysis: Abstractness dependence of subtests correlated to their Flynn effect magnitudes Elijah L. Armstrong a, ⁎, Jan te Nijenhuis b , Michael A. Woodley of Menie c,d , Heitor B.F. Fernandes e , Olev Must f , Aasa Must g a Washington University in St. Louis, United States b National Research Center for Dementia, Chosun University, Gwangju, Republic of Korea c Department of Psychology, Technische Universität Chemnitz, Germany d Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Research, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium e Department of Psychology, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul Department of Psychology, Brazil f Department of Psychology, University of Tartu, Estonia g Estonian National Defense College, Estonia abstract article info Article history: Received 21 December 2015 Received in revised form 24 February 2016 Accepted 24 February 2016 Available online xxxx We examine the association between the strength of the Flynn effect in Estonia and highly convergent panel- ratings of the ‘abstractness’ of nine subtests on the National Intelligence Test, in order to test the theory that the Flynn effect results in part from an increase in the use of abstract reference frames in solving cognitive problems. The vectors of abstractness ratings and Flynn effect gains, controlled for guessing) exhibit a near- zero correlation (r = -.02); however, abstractness correlates positively with (and is therefore confounded by) g-loadings (r = .61). A General Linear Model is used to determine the degree to which the abstractness vector predicts the Flynn effect vector, independently of subtest g-loadings and the portion of the secular IQ gain due to guessing (the Brand effect). Consistent with the abstract reasoning model of the Flynn effect, abstractness pos- itively predicts Flynn effect magnitudes, once controlled for confounds (sr = .44), which indicates an increasing tendency to utilize factors external to the items in order to abstract their solutions. © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Abstract thinking Flynn effect Intelligence National Intelligence Test Estonia g loading 1. Introduction The Flynn effect describes the tendency for IQ scores to rise across tests at a rate of approximately three points per decade (Flynn, 2009; Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015). The causes of this effect are unknown, although many factors have been postulated, including reduced inbreeding, better education, improved nutrition, lower parasite preva- lence, and slower life history speed (see Williams, 2013, and Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015, for reviews of possible causes). To better understand the effect's etiology, it is helpful to understand the profile of tests on which it is most pronounced (e.g., Lynn, 1990; Rushton, 1999; Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015; see also Rushton & Jensen, 2005). Previous research has documented that the Flynn effect is more prominent on tests with lower g loadings, i.e., that correlate less strongly with the set of other tests (te Nijenhuis & van der Flier, 2013); stronger on fluid, as opposed to crystallized, tests (e.g., Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015); and stronger on tests of mathematical achievement, as opposed to verbal achievement (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Rindermann & Thompson, 2013; Wai & Putallaz, 2011). The present study investigates one further proposed determinant of Flynn effect strength — namely ab- stract thinking ability: the capacity to infer general properties when solv- ing problems, and to ignore irrelevant concrete facts (e.g., Flynn, 2009; Jensen, 1998; Pinker, 2011; Terman, 1921, 1922; see Flynn, 1998 for criticism). 1 Some tests, which rely heavily on this ability, such as the Intelligence 57 (2016) xxx–xxx ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: armstrong357@wustl.edu (E.L. Armstrong). 1 Jensen (1998), for instance, defines a similar concept: “In almost every subject in the school curriculum, pupils learn to discover the general rule that applies to a highly specific situation and to apply a general rule in a wide variety of different contexts. The use of sym- bols to stand for things in reading (and musical notation); basic arithmetic operations; consistencies in spelling, grammar, and punctuation; regularities and generalizations in history; categorizing, serializing, enumerating, and inferring in science, and so on. Learn- ing to do these things, which are all part of the school curriculum, instills cognitive habits that can be called decontextualization of cognitive skills” (p. 325). This definition, however, does not exhaust abstract thinking as we define it: we include taking false or unknown hy- potheticals seriously, and having absorbed, and being able to apply, scientific concepts, in our definition (ref. Terman, 1956). Our definition includes one analogical or “decontextualization”-based item, one “scientific spectacles” item that requires answering based on abstract rather than concrete similarities, and one syllogism with a bizarre pre- mise that requires taking false hypotheticals seriously. The second and third are from Flynn (2009) and Luria (1976), respectively; the first is from Flynn (2012) summarizing Fox and Mitchum (2013). These different aspects of abstract reasoning are theoretically separable, but the high correlation between ratings suggests they were related in this dataset. INTELL-01111; No of Pages 6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2016.02.009 0160-2896/© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Intelligence Please cite this article as: Armstrong, E.L., et al., A NIT-picking analysis: Abstractness dependence of subtests correlated to their Flynn effect magnitudes, Intelligence (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2016.02.009