Benefits and Limitations of the Social Network Analysis when explaining instances of ineffective communication in two Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives simulations Milica Stojmenovic SUCCESS, FICT Swinburne University of Technology Melbourne, Australia Gitte Lindgaard HOTLab, Psychology Department Carleton University Ottawa, Canada Abstract—Social Network Analysis (SNA) was performed on a number of emergency response scenarios, including here on two Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) simulations. However, little evidence exists in the literature pertaining to the explanation of communication breakdowns using SNA. In this paper, the SNAs of two CBRNE simulations were compared and the differences in structure were related to instances of ineffective communication. Study 1 had two tiers in the response (commanders and first responders) and Study 2 had three tiers, where Operations (Ops) officers were added between the commanders and first responders. A higher percentage of communication breakdowns were found in Study 2, possibly as a result of the additional layer. However, the two studies had different scenarios and CBRNE responders, both possibly confounding the findings. Researchers using SNA are provided with a convenient representation and summary of team functioning. However basic SNA does not help researchers to distinguish between effective communication and breakdown. Communication breakdowns were attributed to long multi-hop communications, which seldom occurred in the present studies because of the small number of participants in the network, and the large number of communications among them. Keywords—Social network analysis; CBRNE simulations I. INTRODUCTION A. CBRNE simulations CBRNE events are potentially mass casualty events in which the offending substance (i.e. object or chemical) is unknown. An unattended brown package left at an airport is a classic example of a situation that could lead to one of these events. The contents of the package can vary infinitely and managing such an event is hard because of that unpredictability. In CBRNE events, the immediate area around the threat is called the hot zone. Further away is the warm zone which is not in immediate danger but is relatively close to the offending substance. Then, further removed from the hot zone is the cold zone, a safe area where the command post is set up. When a CBRNE event occurs, the emergency response team typically includes emergency medical services (EMS) police and their teams (generalists, bomb technicians, identification and forensic officers), firefighters and their specialized team of hazardous materials technicians (hazmat), and other first responders. The EMS team is in charge of evacuating and treating patients. The police generalists are responsible for sectioning off the area to the public, the bomb technicians are in charge of deactivating the bomb (if there is one), and the identification and forensic officers are responsible for acquiring evidence, should the case go to court. The firefighters' goal is to take out the fire, while the hazmat team is there to decontaminate the offending agent. B. CBRNE Response Strucutre The response structure varies depending on the size and complexity of the CBRNE event. If it is deemed large, then there are three sections in the response structure: the first responders, the Operations (Ops) officers, and the commanders. If it is smaller, then there are no Ops officers. First responders (FR) directly deal with the offending agent in the hot zone [1], in Figure 1. FR include paramedics, generalists, bomb technicians, identification, forensic firefighters and hazmat officers. In larger events, FR take orders and only report to their own Ops officers. When the event is deemed large, then each of the three agencies has an Ops officer that set up post in the warm zone. Together, these Ops officers work to create a short- term agenda and coordinate with each other to manage the first responders in the hot zone [1]. In addition, Ops officers are responsible for updating the commanders in the command post. In fact, when the event is complex and Ops officers are required, the first responders only communicate with their Ops officers, who relay this information to their commanders. However, if the event is smaller, then the Ops layer is left out of the response, and the commanders take on their responsibilities. In every event, the command post is far from the hot zone, in the cold zone, for the safety of the commanders. This team's objective is to coordinate the emergency response so that it maximizes safety for both people and property, by diminishing the threat [1]. There are usually four commanders: one Incident Commander (IC), and one from each of police, fire, and EMS. The IC is in charge of coordinating the command post and of communicating and giving orders to all of the commanders and Ops officers. He or she can also veto the short-term agenda created by the Ops officers. The remaining three commanders are in charge of approving the short-term agenda before it goes to the IC, 2013 IEEE Third International Conference on Cloud and Green Computing 978-0-7695-5114-2/13 $26.00 © 2013 Crown Copyright DOI 10.1109/CGC.2013.58 327 2013 IEEE Third International Conference on Cloud and Green Computing 978-0-7695-5114-2/13 $26.00 © 2013 Crown Copyright DOI 10.1109/CGC.2013.58 327 2013 IEEE Third International Conference on Cloud and Green Computing 978-0-7695-5114-2/13 $26.00 © 2013 Crown Copyright DOI 10.1109/CGC.2013.58 327