Biblioteca della libertà, L, 2015 maggio-agosto, n. 213 online • ISSN 2035-5866 [www.centroeinaudi.it] 63 Sarah Songhorian Neuroethics: The relaion between philosophical relecion and empirical research 1. NeuroscieNce of ethics: A methodologicAl chAlleNge The aim of this paper is to focus on the most relevant methodological challenge that neu- roethicists have to face when dealing with the neuroscience of ethics (Roskies 2002), that is with the contribution empirical research in general and neuroscience in particular can make to our knowledge of moral issues. Before considering any substantial thesis in the debate, those who are interested in neuroethics have to try and answer a tricky question: how, and to what extent, can empirical analysis modify philosophical theories? That is, how can the way things are inluence the way they should or ought to be? If, for instance, neuroimaging studies would modify our conception of free will or of moral decision-making, one would have to understand irst how this interaction is possible. I will claim that the role of empirical indings is showing the most likely bases upon which certain constructs of the philosophical debate are built. Yet a worry can arise concerning the relation between empirical indings and theoretical analysis and it has deep routes into the philosophical debate. The interpretation of Hume’s “is/ought” passage, the division be- tween fact and values (for a discussion see Putnam 2002), and Moore’s argument against the naturalistic fallacy (1903) have made any attempt to consider scientiic discoveries into the philosophical debate hard. G.E. Moore’s diatribe against the naturalistic fallacy in 1903 set the stage for most of twenti- eth-century moral philosophy. The main protagonists over the next sixty years were intuitionists and emotivists, both of whom were convinced by Moore that empirical science is irrelevant to moral philosophy and common moral beliefs. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when a wider array of moral theories entered the scene and applied ethics became popular, few moral philosophers paid much attention to developments in biology and psychology. This isolation must end. Moral philosophers cannot continue to ignore developments in psycholo- gy, brain science, and biology. Of course, philosophers need to be careful when they draw lessons from empirical research. As Moore and his followers argued, we should not jump straight from