ATTENTION,VOLUNTARISM, AND LIBERTY IN DESCARTES’ S ACCOUNT OF JUDGMENT Lex Newman Abstract: This essay addresses two main aspects of Descartes’s views on the mind’s voluntary control over judgment. First, I argue that in his view, the mind’s control over judgment is indirect: rather than believing things di- rectly at will, the mind’s voluntary control is exercised by directing its attention to reasons—the reasons then doing the work of determining either assent, dissent, or suspen- sion. Second, I argue that the foregoing indirect volun- tarism account undermines an influential line of argument purporting to show that Descartes holds a compatibilist ac- count of the mind’s liberty in its judgment formation. On the broader interpretation that emerges, Descartes assigns a more significant role to attention in proper judgment formation than has generally been acknowledged. Scholarly debate continues about Descartes’s views on the mind’s voluntary control over judgment. Focusing on two aspects of the broader debate, I argue that he assigns a fundamental role to attention—specifically, the will’s power to help direct the perception of the intellect. The first aspect of the debate concerns the directness of the mind’s voluntary control. As usually interpreted, Descartes accepts a voluntarism that gives the mind significant power to believe things, at will—an ability to form judgments, or to withhold them, even without the help of reasons. 1 I argue, to the contrary, that Descartes holds an indirect voluntarism whereby the mind’s control over judgment arises from the ability to direct its perceptual attention towards reasons, the reasons then determining the judgment. 2 In section 1, I sketch an account of indirect voluntarism suited to his theory of judgment. Section 2 defends this account as providing the best interpretation. The second aspect of the debate concerns the nature of will’s liberty, in its voluntary control over judgment. That Descartes affirms a freewill account of judgment is uncontroversial. Ongoing debate concerns whether his con- ception of freewill is a version of compatibilism or instead incompatibilism. 1 Cf. Broughton 2002, 58, Della Rocca 2006, 149, Williams 1978, 176–183, and Wilson 1978, 145, all of whom attribute to Descartes at least a partial DVA. 2 Cottingham (2002, 353–355) suggests such an interpretation, though without developing it. Res Philosophica, Vol. 92, No. 1, January 2015, pp. 61–91 http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2015.92.1.5 c  2015 Lex Newman • c  2015 Res Philosophica