Driver behaviour at rail level crossings: Responses to flashing lights, traffic signals and stop signs in simulated rural driving Michael G. Lenné * , Christina M. Rudin-Brown, Jordan Navarro, Jessica Edquist, Margaret Trotter, Nebojsa Tomasevic Human Factors Group, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Building 70, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia article info Article history: Received 6 November 2009 Accepted 2 August 2010 Keywords: Passive level crossings Active crossing controls Driving simulator Driver behaviour Compliance abstract Australian road and railway authorities have made a concerted effort to reduce the number of rail level crossings, particularly the higher risk passive crossings that are protected by devices such as ‘give way’ or ‘stop’ signs. To improve this situation, passive level crossings are often upgraded with active controls such as flashing red lights. Traffic signals may provide good safety outcomes at level crossings but remain untested. The primary purpose of this research was to compare driver behaviour at two railway level crossings with active controls, flashing red lights and traffic signals, to behaviour at the current standard passive level crossing control, a stop sign. Participants drove the MUARC advanced driving simulator for 30 min. During the simulated drive, participants were exposed to three level crossing scenarios. Each scenario consisted of one of three level crossing control types, and was associated with an oncoming train. Mean vehicle speed on approach to the level crossings decreased more rapidly in response to flashing lights than to traffic signals. While speed on approach was lowest for the stop-sign condition, the number of non-compliant drivers (i.e., those who did not stop) at the crossing was highest for this condition. While results indicate that traffic signals at rail level crossings do not appear to offer any safety benefits over and above flashing red lights, further avenues of research are proposed to reach more definitive conclusions. Compliance was lowest for the passive crossing control which provides further support for the ongoing passive crossing upgrades in Australia. Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction While there has been a recent increase in rail safety research (Wilson and Norris, 2005), the intersection of the railway system with the road transport system, through rail level crossings (RLCs), repre- sents one key area in which optimum efficient performance has not yet been achieved. Adverse outcomes at RLCs, such as collisions between trains and vehicles, impact both the efficiency and safety of the rail and road systems. As an example of the size of the problem, there were 2592 accidents and 892 fatalities at RLCs in the European Union across 2006e2007 (European Railway Agency, 2009). In the US in 2007 there were 2206 crashes and 229 deaths (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009). Within Australia during 2009 there were 58 collisions at RLCs (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2009). These crashes typically involve traumatic injury, and the economic impacts of disruption on the rail and road networks are significant. This is particularly so for heavy vehicle collisions as they have a much greater potential to derail the train. Across Australia there are approximately 9400 rail level cross- ings, with 6060 passive (60%), 2650 (30%) active, and 690 (10%) having other forms of control (Australian Transport Council, 2003). Level crossings are not homogeneous; some provide active warn- ings (e.g., flashing red lights), while others provide only stop signs (referred to hereafter as passive crossings). In addition, there are differences in the volume of rail and road traffic, the type and speed of traffic, overall RLC geometry, and so on. All of these factors shape road user behaviour at RLCs and thus the appropriate solution. Compliance with level crossing controls has been found to be variable and ranging from 10% to 67% with flashing lights (Meeker and Barr, 1989; Pickett and Grayson, 1996; Tenkink & Van der Horst, 1990) and from 14% to 38% with barrier gates and lights (Meeker et al.,1997; Witte and Donohue, 2000). Yet as noted previously (e.g., Tenkink & Van der Horst, 1990), the various causes of level crossing crashes remain poorly understood, but fall into two broad classes. The first is unintentional error, encompassing situations where the drivers may fail to detect the warnings or to apprehend their meaning, even if the * Corresponding author. Tel.: þ61 3 9905 1389; fax: þ61 3 9905 4363. E-mail address: Michael.Lenne@monash.edu (M.G. Lenné). Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Applied Ergonomics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/apergo 0003-6870/$ e see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.apergo.2010.08.011 Applied Ergonomics 42 (2011) 548e554