Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom Galen Barry University of Virginia ABSTRACT We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves— namely, the power to do otherwise. ARTICLE HISTORY Received 8 February 2015; Revised 12 November 2015 KEYWORDS Spinoza; freedom; necessitarianism; association; projection 1. Introduction 1 When I choose cereal over toast in the morning, there is something about my decision that makes it feel free to me. I do not simply infer my freedom from some other datum; rather, I seem to be directly or immediately aware of it. This felt freedom is one of the most distinctive features of human agency. In its most complete form, it has two key components. First, it represents the agent as a source of causal activity rather than as a mere link in a causal chain. For instance, I do not merely observe my choice of cereal as one event in a series leading from bed to work. Instead, it feels as if I am making the decision without compulsion. This first component represents what is often called our liberty of spontaneity. Second, the feeling includes a representation of alternative possi- bilities. When I choose the cereal, I also attend to some of my other culinary options— that is, I feel myself choosing cereal instead of toast. This second component of the feel- ing represents what is often called our liberty of indifference. 2 Many mediaeval and early modern thinkers cite the feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian freedom (‘freedom’, hereafter). William of Ockham, for 1 For Spinoza, I use the following abbreviations: E D Ethics (d D definition; a D axiom; pD proposition; d D dem- onstration; c D corollary; s D scholium); G D Opera, ed. Gebhardt; C D The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I, trans. Curley; S D The Letters, trans. Shirley. For Descartes, I use these: AT D Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Adam and Tannery; CSM D The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols. IÀII, trans. Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch. 2 Descartes, however, claims that the feeling is greatest when the feeling of indifference is absent [AT VII 59/CSM II 41]. © 2016 Australasian Journal of Philosophy AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1129632 Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 22:30 07 February 2016