262 © Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences THE IS-OUGHT PROBLEM, THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT, AND THE NEW SCIENCE OF MORALITY RADIM BĚLOHRAD Abstract: The article deals with a recent attack by Sam Harris on two famous arguments that purport to establish a gap between factual and evaluative statements—Hume’s Is-Ought Problem and Moore’s Open Question Argument. I present the arguments, analyze the relationship between them and critically assess Harris’ attempt to refute them. I conclude that Harris’ attempt fails. Keywords: is-ought, open question argument, Harris, science, a priori Introduction I believe it would not be an exaggeration to say that one of the most influential arguments and challenges in analytic ethics of the past century has been the Open Question Argument by G. E. Moore. Facing Moore’s challenge seems to be a precondition of a successful theory of metaethics. And understandably so. If successful, the argument would show a rather disappointing thing: the good, by many taken to be the central ethical concept, cannot be defined. It is a concept that admits of no analysis and the corresponding property of goodness resists any reduction to some more elementary and perhaps more homely properties. Moore’s ideas about the meaning of the predicate good are closely related to David Hume’s famous statement that one cannot derive an ought statement from an is statement—the Is- Ought Problem. In this paper I first want to formulate precisely both claims and show the relationship between them. Then, I will focus on a recent attack on Hume and Moore by the American neuroscientist Sam Harris, who claims that the challenge they pose is merely a “verbal trap” (Harris 2010, 6). I will assess his ideas related to the two arguments and claim that he fails to meet their challenges. The Is-Ought Problem and the Open Question Argument David Hume formulated the Is-Ought Problem in his work A Treatise of Human Nature, where he says: HUMAN AFFAIRS 21, 262–271, 2011 DOI: 10.2478/s13374-011-0027-3 Unauthenticated Download Date | 3/29/17 3:47 PM