Culture, memory, and the self: An analysis of the personal and collective self in long-term memory q Brandon M. Wagar a, * and Dov Cohen b a Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ont., Canada N2L 3G1 b Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL, 61820, USA Received 3 December 2001; revised 7 August 2002 Abstract We used a memory paradigm to test whether the nature of representations of the self within long-term memory differed as a function of cultural background. In Western samples words encoded in relation to the self are typically remembered better, and Euro-Canadian participants here showed this standard self-reference effect. However, Asian-Canadian participants were slower to recognize personal traits (as opposed to collective traits) when these traits had been encoded in reference to the self, suggesting a more elaborate representation of the collective self than the personal self in long-term memory. Further, memory was actually inhibited for Asian-Canadians when personal traits were encoded in reference to the self (vs. encoded with other referents). Dif- ferences in long-term memory trace strength for self-related data may emerge even as differences in the working self do not, and implications of this difference are discussed. Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. Keywords: Culture; Long-term memory; Self; Self-reference effect; Independence; Interdependence; Individualism; Collectivism; Self-schema; Self- concept Introduction Measuring the contents of the self can be a particu- larly difficult task for cross-cultural researchers. This is evident when one examines the presumed individualistic vs. collectivistic (or independent/interdependent) nature of North American vs. East Asian selves. Supposedly stable, chronic cultural differences between groups can be overridden by temporary primes that call forth different aspects of the self (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Oishi, Wyer, & Colcombe, 2000; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). And straight- forward questionnaire items can reveal no differences between groups, even when differences may show up in subtler measures (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Kitayama, 2002; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemm- elmeier, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997). The idea of the dynamic self-concept can help sort out some of these seemingly conflicting results (Hong et al., 2000; Markus & Wurf, 1987). In this paper, we argue that there can be differences in the self-concept in long-term memory that may emerge, even when the working selves that are activated in a given context are quite similar. Culture and the dynamic self As scholars such as Triandis (1989), Trafimow et al. (1991), Markus and Kityama (1991), and others have argued, there is an important distinction to be drawn betweenthinkingofoneselfintermsofpersonalitytraits versus thinking of oneself in terms of collective traits or social roles. The private self contains cognitions that consist of traits, states or behaviors (e.g., happy, smart, and conscientious), while the collective self consists of cognitions involving group memberships, relationships, and social roles (e.g., brother, son, teammate, and Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 468–475 www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp Journal of Experimental Social Psychology q We are indebted to Fergus Craik, Mike Dixon, Elizabeth Leal, MikeRoss,andPiotrWinkielmanfortheirhelpandcommentsonthis project. This research was supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant to D.C. * Corresponding author. Fax: +519-746-8631. E-mail address: bmwagar@uwaterloo.ca (B.M. Wagar). 0022-1031/$ - see front matter Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00021-0